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“If one set out by design to devise a system for provoking
intrusive post-traumatic symptoms, one could not do better
than a court of law.” 1 Judith Herman
PRELUDE
The scene is a small, plain courtroom: the carpeting deep
blue, the walls a light grey. It could be anywhere in the
United States. A woman sits in the witness chair, looking
straight ahead. She came to this country from somewhere
else, and she is seeking political asylum.
To her right, an immigration judge in a black robe sits at
a raised wooden bench. A large government seal dominates
the wall behind her. There are tables for the lawyers, with a
podium between them, and several rows of empty benches
behind a wooden railing. An interpreter sits in a chair, a
notepad in his lap.
The U.S. Government’s lawyer stands at the podium,
asking questions in a clipped monotone. The judge listens
intently and stares at the applicant as if she knows where
things are going.
“Remember that you are under oath. Is it your testimony

1. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 72 (1992).

01 PASKEY FINAL

2016]

5/18/2016 3:49 PM

TELLING REFUGEE STORIES

459

that police arrested you during a political demonstration in
the capital?
“Yes,” the applicant replies through the interpreter.
“And you were held in jail for approximately three
weeks?”
“Yes,” again.
And while you were held in jail, you were raped twice by
guards?”
A brief pause. “Yes.”
“Is there anyone in the United States who can confirm
what happened to you?”
“No.”
“Do you have any papers to prove you were arrested?”
“Of course not. Why would the police give me papers?
They do as they please.”
“Ma’am, I am asking ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions. Please just
answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Do you understand?”
“I understand.” A pause. “No, I do not have any papers.”
“In May of last year did you sign a declaration that
explains why you are applying for asylum?”
“Yes.”
“Did your lawyer read that declaration to you, through an
interpreter, before you signed it?”
“Yes.”
“And you swore to tell the truth?”
“Yes.”
“In your declaration, did you say you were held in jail for
only one week?”
“I . . . I’m not . . .”
“Please answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Would you like me to read
your declaration to you?”
“Yes. That is what I said. One week.”
“And in your declaration, you did not say anything about
being raped?”
“I did not.”
“Can you explain why your testimony today is different
from your declaration?”
The woman looks abruptly at her lawyer, who remains
expressionless. She turns back to the judge and shakes her
head.
“How can I explain?,” she asks. “I am telling the truth.”
Twenty minutes later, the woman and her lawyer leave
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the courtroom. The judge has denied her claim for asylum
after finding she is not credible. An appeals court will later
uphold the judge’s ruling, and the woman will be deported.
INTRODUCTION
This story is a fiction, 2 but it reflects the reality often
faced by survivors of psychological trauma when they seek
political asylum in U.S. immigration courts. 3 By design, the
courts are adversarial. And by its nature, that adjudication
system is biased against the stories told by trauma survivors.
Claims for asylum are a striking example of storytelling
in the context of law. The applicant must prove either past
persecution or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution. 4
To meet that burden, the applicant must testify about her 5
life before she arrived in the United States. In most cases,
there is only one witness—the applicant—and no direct
evidence to corroborate or contradict her story.
Thus,
whether asylum is granted depends largely on the applicant’s
ability to tell a “good” story; one an immigration judge deems
to be “credible” and that fits within the statutory definition of
a “refugee.”
In most cases, the judge has at least two versions of the
story: the applicant’s oral testimony, and a written
declaration prepared by either a lawyer or community group. 6

2. Though this story is a fiction, it draws on the author’s experiences.
Between 1995 and 1998, the author worked as a Dept. of Justice trial attorney
with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, and represented the
U.S. government in more than 600 asylum cases.
3. See e.g., Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2007). In Zeru, an
asylum applicant stated on different occasions that she had been raped either
once, twice, or three times. Despite expert testimony proving that the applicant
was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the First Circuit
upheld an immigration judge’s conclusion that she was not credible. Id. at 69–
70.
4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (stating that a “refugee” is eligible for
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that an applicant has the burden of
proof); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (defining “refugee”).
5. Many applicants, of course, are men. In the absence of an accepted
gender neutral pronoun or a graceful way of avoiding gendered pronouns in
every sentence, I’ve chosen to use “she” and “her” to refer to asylum applicants
throughout this article.
6. See Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting An A/Effective
Personal Statement To Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE 249, 255–56 (2008) (discussing the role of a
declaration in claims for asylum).
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The only other evidence typically consists of written
background reports on “country conditions” prepared by the
U.S. State Department and human rights groups. 7 In most
cases, then, the only direct evidence regarding the applicant’s
life experience is the applicant’s story itself, told in a foreign
courtroom and filtered through lawyers, lay representatives,
or interpreters.
Against this backdrop, the judge will consider the
applicant’s declaration and testimony, and will assess the
demeanor, candor, and responsiveness of the applicant, the
“inherent plausibility” of the story, and whether the
applicant’s statements are both internally consistent and
consistent with other evidence. 8 If the judge concludes the
applicant is not credible, asylum will almost certainly be
denied.
But psychological trauma is common among refugees, 9
and the stories told by trauma survivors defy our expectations
for a “credible” story.
Trauma narratives tend to be
fragmented
and
disjointed,
both
logically
and
10
They may be lacking in detail, and the
chronologically.
story will typically change over time, even with regard to
critical details, as the survivor begins to heal. 11 None of these
things are a reliable measure of whether a survivor is
truthful, and yet they are the very things an immigration
7. In determining whether an asylum applicant is credible, an
immigration judge may consider whether the applicant’s statements are
consistent with “reports of the Department of State on country conditions.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Similarly, applicants often submit reports from
groups like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International.
See U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Division Training Programs,
Burden of Proof, Standards of Proof, and Evidence 17–18, available
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-divisiontraining-programs (last visited July 2, 2015) (hereinafter “Asylum Officer
Training”).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (setting standards for determining the
credibility of asylum applicants).
9. Research on PTSD among refugees has found widely varying rates,
with the prevalence of trauma ranging from 4% to 86% depending on sample
size, country of origin, and other factors. Hollifield, M., Warner, T.D., Lian, N.,
Krakow, B., Jenkins, J.H., Kesler, J., Stevenson, J., & Westermeyer, J.,
Measuring trauma and health status in refugees: A critical review, JOURNAL OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 611–621 (2002). See also, Elisa E.
Bolton, PTSD in Refugees, available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/
trauma/other/ptsd-refugees.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
10. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175–79.
11. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180.
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judge will typically point to as evidence that an asylum
seeker is not credible. 12 Indeed, inconsistencies within and
among various versions of an applicant’s story are by far the
most common factor cited by immigration judges when they
make a negative credibility finding in an asylum case. 13
In this country, core traits of the adjudication system
compound the problem. In contrast to procedures used by
some governments, 14 the United States subjects most asylum
seekers to adversarial cross-examination by a government
lawyer. 15 It does so in the apparent belief that crossexamination is an “engine” for “the discovery of truth.” 16 But
when the applicant is a trauma survivor and the only
evidence is the applicant’s story, aggressive crossexamination is more likely to obscure the truth than reveal it
—especially when an applicant is not represented.
The process also assumes that a judge with no training in
the effects of trauma can reliably assess the credibility of a
survivor. Indeed, as disputes over expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome demonstrate, our legal system assumes
judges and juries can reliably assess the credibility of any and
all witnesses without the benefit of training or expert
guidance. 17 However, when the witness is a trauma survivor,
that assumption is not true.
Moreover, by requiring an applicant to tell her story

12. Because immigration judges are administrative law judges, their
factual findings are subject to the substantial evidence standard, and a
reviewing court must uphold the judge’s determination if it is supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Thus, judges routinely identify for the
record the reasons why they concluded an applicant is not credible. For a
detailed analysis of the review standard and suggested alternatives, see Andrew
Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 581 (November 2013).
13. See infra, text accompanying notes 85 to 99, discussing the results from
a study of 369 decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeal.
14. For a comparative analysis of the asylum adjudication systems in
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see generally
Peter W. Billings, A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative
Systems for Determining Asylum Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2000).
15. Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court Practice
Manual 83, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-chief-immigrationjudge-0 (last visited June 10, 2013) (hereafter “EOIR Practice Manual”).
16. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 29 (3d ed. 1940).
17. See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert
Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991 (2007).
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repeatedly over a lengthy period and “freezing” an early
version in writing, the adjudication process increases the
likelihood that a survivor will present inconsistent versions of
her story. 18 The role of lawyers and community groups
introduces still further challenges. If the applicant is a
survivor, inconsistencies between an applicant’s declaration
and oral testimony are likely to say as much about the work
habits and writing style of the person who drafted the
declaration as they do about the applicant’s credibility.
This Article examines these issues from the perspective
of scholarship on psychological trauma. Part II summarizes
the standard for asylum and the process by which asylum
claims are adjudicated in the United States. It concludes
with the results of original research on 369 asylum decisions
issued by federal appeals courts in 2010. A systematic review
of the cases demonstrates that when immigration judges
conclude an applicant is not credible, they overwhelmingly
rely on inconsistencies within or among the various versions
of the applicant’s story, and especially inconsistencies
between the testimony and declaration.
Part III introduces a useful concept from structuralist
narrative theory: the distinction between story and discourse,
between the content of a story (characters and events) and
the way the story is told. That distinction is critical to an
understanding of the differences between multiple versions of
a single story (the testimony and declaration, for instance), as
well as the effects of trauma on storytelling. The most critical
point is this: judges and lawyers typically assume that
trauma impacts only the way an applicant tells her story—
the discourse—but not the content of the story itself.
Empirical research has proven that assumption to be wrong. 19
The Article then turns directly to the challenges faced by
survivors who seek asylum. After explaining the symptoms of
trauma, Part IV examines the effects of trauma on a
survivor’s ability to tell her story and the role of storytelling
in the recovery process. Part V re-examines the asylum
18. In a study of refugees who suffered from PTSD, for instance, British
researchers found that the rate of discrepancies increased substantially when
they told their stories twice with a delay of six to seven months. Jane Herlihy &
Stuart Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken
as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE 81 (2006).
19. See infra, text discussing notes 159 to 167.
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adjudication system. It begins by reconsidering the process
by which immigration judges evaluate credibility, then
explores the ways a lawyer’s handling of a case can impact an
immigration judge’s credibility findings.
The final section, Part VI, surveys proposals for reform,
then recommends that the U.S. Government eliminate
adversarial hearings for asylum seekers. In addition, both
judges and lawyers should be trained to understand the
symptoms and effects of trauma, and especially the impact of
trauma on a survivor’s ability to tell her story.
But in some respects the scope of this Article is limited:
there are other cultural, psychological, and practical issues
that may affect a survivor’s testimony, ranging from feelings
of shame or a fear of authority figures to the challenges of
Though the Article does not
accurate interpretation. 20
consider these issues, they further support the Article’s
central claim—that an adversarial hearing is a deeply and
inherently flawed way to assess the credibility of asylum
applicants who have experienced traumatic events.
I. THE ADJUDICATION OF CREDIBILITY IN U.S. CLAIMS
FOR ASYLUM
In the words of a former immigration judge, the system
by which the United States adjudicates claims for asylum is a
“byzantine,” “crazy-quilt method” for deciding cases on which
an applicant’s life may depend. 21 This section will walk
readers through that method and then present the results of
original empirical research on the reasons why immigration
judges find applicants not to be credible.
A. The Asylum Adjudication Process
Asylum is potentially available to any foreign national
20. For instance, trauma survivors often feel shame, guilt, or self-loathing
about their experiences, and survivor’s ability to discuss her experiences in the
presence of lawyers and judges may be diminished by cultural factors, gender
roles, a fear of authority figures, or the social repercussions of talking about a
rape with strangers. Herman, supra note 1, at 94; See David Gangsei & Ana C.
Deutsch, Psychological Evaluation of Asylum Seekers as a Therapeutic Process,
17 TORTURE 79, 80, 82 (2007). Moreover, because the goal of torturers is often to
make their victims talk, a torture survivor may associate talking in a legal
setting “with the experience of forced talking under torture.” Id. at 80.
21. Bruce J. Einhorn, The Gift of Understanding, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 149,
152, 156 (2010).
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who is physically present in the United States. 22 It is also
available to any foreign national who seeks admission at a
port of entry if the government determines, after an
interview, that the person has a “credible fear” of
persecution. 23 The ultimate goal of the adjudication process is
to determine whether the applicant is a “refugee.” The
applicant has the burden of proof 24 and must demonstrate she
is unwilling or unable to return to her country of nationality
or citizenship 25 because of past persecution or a “well-founded
fear” of future persecution. 26 The term “persecution” is
construed narrowly to include only serious (and usually
physical) harm. 27
The applicant must also prove she has been (or may be)
targeted for persecution “on account of” race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or “membership in a particular

22. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). Refugee status may also be granted to certain
persons who are outside the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee”). But if the applicant is
stateless (i.e., the applicant “has no nationality”), the assessment will focus
instead on the country of the applicant’s “last habitual residence.” Id.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
To establish a “well-founded fear” of
persecution, an applicant must demonstrate that her fear is both subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable. See e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183,
1191–92 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. See, e.g., Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 1996) (two
arrests with beatings and interrogation that the applicant did not characterize
as “severe” or “excessive” did not establish past persecution); Thomas v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that escalating
intimidation and a serious threat of physical violence established persecution);
Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding death
threats along with beatings of family members and murders of political allies
constitute persecution). The term persecution does not include lesser forms of
discrimination. E.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (treatment
of feminists in Iran was not so harsh as to amount to “persecution”). Nor does it
include purely economic harms unless they threatened a person’s life or
freedom. See, e.g., Li v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage which
threatens a petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution). In one case,
the Ninth Circuit held that a Seventh Day Adventist minister had not suffered
past persecution by being forced to serve as a porter for the Burmese military.
Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004). However, because a fellow
minister had been tortured and killed, the Court concluded that the applicant
had a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. For a broader discussion of asylum’s
persecution requirement, see Michael English, Distinguishing True Persecution
from Legitimate Prosecution in American Asylum Law, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 109
(2007).
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social group.” 28 A generalized fear of civil strife will not
suffice, 29 nor will a threat motivated by personal animosity. 30
The standard is forward-looking: while past persecution
creates a presumption that an applicant has a well-founded
fear of future persecution, the Government can rebut that
presumption by showing that circumstances have changed, or
that internal relocation is both possible and reasonable. 31 But
in extreme cases, past persecution alone may be sufficient if
the applicant demonstrates “compelling reasons” why he or
she is unwilling to return to the country “arising out of the
severity of the past persecution.” 32
Certain classes of applicants are barred as a matter of
law. Some are excluded because the applicant was firmly
resettled in another country 33 or could safely relocate to
another part of her own country. 34 Still others are excluded
for “bad” behavior, ranging from assistance in the persecution
of others 35 to terrorism-related activity 36 to a conviction for
certain crimes. 37 But even if an applicant clears these
hurdles, an immigration judge still has discretion to deny her
application on other, unspecified grounds. 38
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Several circuits have formally adopted the
doctrine of “mixed motives,” which recognizes that an applicant may be eligible
for asylum if her alleged persecutors have multiple motives as long as at least
one of the motives is among those specified in the statute. E.g., Mohideen v.
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
29. E.g., Rasiah v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (“simply because
civil strife causes substantial hardships for an ethnic minority, that does not
automatically entitle all members of that minority to asylum”).
30. E.g., Zayas-Marini v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that death threats grounded only in “personal animosity” were not grounds for
asylum).
31. 8 C.F.R. 206.16(b)(1)(i).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 CFR § 208.15 (defining “firm
resettlement”).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
35. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42) & 1158(b)(2)(A)(i).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction for serious non-political crime); 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (conviction for aggravated felony).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Attorney General “may”
grant asylum to an eligible refugee); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14 (stating that an
immigration judge “may grant or deny asylum in the exercise of discretion”).
While immigration judges can and sometimes do deny asylum to otherwise
eligible applicants on purely discretionary grounds, such denials are rare and
are generally based on egregious conduct by the applicant. See, e.g., Aioub v.
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2008) (asylum denied because of
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To meet her burden, an applicant must tell a story about
her life. The context for this legal storytelling is unusual.
The principle of res judicata is founded on the premise that a
litigant is entitled to a single adjudication of any claim. 39 But
for asylum cases, there are two distinct systems of
adjudication, run by separate agencies. Some applicants
receive a non-adversarial interview; some an adversarial
hearing. Many claims are adjudicated twice, 40 and asylum
can be granted after either adjudication. There is no “law of
the case” doctrine, and the second adjudication (if there is
one) is entirely de novo. 41
The adjudication process begins with a government
form 42 on which the applicant provides biographic
information and summarizes the facts underlying her claim.
Many applicants also submit a declaration presenting the
facts in greater detail than the form allows. The declaration
is typically drafted by a lawyer if the applicant has one, or by
a community group if she does not. 43

applicant’s fraudulent marriage); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th
Cir. 2007) (asylum denied because of applicant’s three drunk-driving
convictions).
39. See, e.g., Mahmood v. Research in Mot. Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d, 515 Fed. Appx. 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
40. The exact percentage is impossible to determine: two separate federal
agencies are involved, and there are no statistics that track individual cases
through the complete system. That said, the number is probably more than 20
percent. In fiscal year 2014, for instance, asylum offices referred roughly 50% of
all cases to an immigration court, and 44% of the cases adjudicated by
immigration judges that year had previously been adjudicated by an asylum
officer.Those percentages were calculated from data separately maintained by
the Asylum Office, see infra note 64, and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, see infra note 71..
41. If an alien in removal proceedings expresses fear of persecution and
files an application for asylum, the immigration judge must conduct a hearing
and consider the application unless the alien previously filed an application that
was referred to (and considered by) another immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. §
1240.11(c).
42. See 8 CFR § 208.3.
Department of Homeland Security, I-589,
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589.pdf
(last
visited
September 26, 2014).
43. Asylum applicants in removal proceedings are entitled to assistance by
counsel of their choice at no expense to the government. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(4)(A). Some scholars have argued that the Government should provide
free representation to indigent applicants. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 295, 384 (2007) (hereinafter
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Once this paperwork is ready, the process diverges. If
the government has initiated a removal case against the
applicant—or if the applicant seeks asylum after a credible
fear interview—the claim is defensive and will be adjudicated
by an immigration judge during an adversarial hearing. 44
Other claims are affirmative, and the applicant will receive a
non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer. 45 But
asylum officers grant just 47% of the claims they adjudicate. 46
A larger number of applicants —50% of the total—are placed
in removal proceedings, where they receive a second,
adversarial adjudication. Because the adversarial hearings
are the same for all applicants, this discussion will begin with
an asylum interview and follow an affirmative claim through
the process.
Asylum officers are employees of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency in the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). 47 Most officers are not lawyers,
but all receive extensive training. 48 Asylum interviews are
conducted under oath but are not recorded or transcribed.
The officer’s handwritten notes are the only record of the
applicant’s statements, and the applicant has no opportunity
to review the notes or challenge their accuracy. 49 If an
“Refugee Roulette”).
44. See 8 CFR 208.2(a) (delineating the respective jurisdictions of
immigration judges and asylum officers). See also EOIR Practice Manual at 38
(discussing the procedural differences between affirmative and defensive
claims).
45. See 8 CFR 208.2 (outlining the respective jurisdictions of the asylum
offices and immigration courts).
46. For an explanation of the data and sources on which that figure is
based, see infra, text accompanying notes 64 to 67 and source cited therein.
47. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Refugee, Asylum, and
International
Operations,
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
directorates-and-program-offices/refugee-asylum-and-international-operationsdirectorate (last visited June 12, 2015). Prior to the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security in 2003, most immigration functions were performed by
employees of the Justice Department. See generally U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Our History, available at http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/our-history (last visited June 12, 2015).
48. The training includes a 5–1/2 week course required of all USCIS
immigration officers, and a five-week Asylum Officer Basic Training Course.
Supervisory asylum officers receive an additional two weeks of training. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Division and Training
Programs,
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugeesasylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs (last visited June 12, 2015).
49. The procedures for asylum interviews state that the record shall consist
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applicant needs an interpreter she must provide one, and
many use a family member or friend. 50
By design, the interviews are non-adversarial. 51 Training
materials explain that the officer is a “neutral decisionmaker” rather than an “advocate,” and that a non-adversarial
interview allows an applicant to present her claim in “as
unrestricted a manner as possible, within the inherent
constraints of an interview before a government official.” 52
Officers are instructed to treat applicants with respect, to be
“nonjudgmental and non-moralistic,” and to “create an
atmosphere in which the applicant can freely express his or
her claim.” 53
The applicant may bring a lawyer or another
representative to the interview, 54 but the government is not
represented. 55 The representative’s role is limited: he or she
may ask questions about points the officer did not cover, and
may also comment on the evidence and make a closing
statement. 56 The documentary evidence typically consists of
background material on the applicant’s country of nationality
or citizenship, including reports from human rights
These
organizations and the Department of State. 57

of the application, other documents submitted by the applicant, comments from
the Department of State, and “other information specific to the applicant’s
case.” 8 C.F.R. 208.9(f). The applicant’s statements are not ordinarily recorded:
instead, the training for asylum officers includes a module on taking clear and
comprehensive handwritten notes. See generally Asylum Officer Training,
supra note 7, Interviewing Part 2: Notetaking.
50. The training for asylum officers notes that there are few limits on who
may serve as an interpreter, and readily acknowledges the “inherent”
challenges of working with an interpreter. Asylum Officer Training, supra note
7, Interviewing Part 6: Working with an Interpreter at 7–8, 12–15.
51. 8 CFR § 208.9(b).
52. Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 6.
53. Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 7–8.
54. In lieu of an attorney, an applicant may be represented during the
interview by a person accredited by the Board of Immigration Appeals, by a law
student or law graduate not yet admitted to the bar, or by a “reputable person”
who meets certain criteria. See 8 CFR 292.1.
55. Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7, Interviewing Part I: Overview of
Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 6.
56. 8 CFR § 208.9(d). See also Asylum Officer Training, supra note 7,
Interviewing Part I: Overview of Nonadversarial Asylum Interview at 23
(discussing the role of a representative).
57. 8 CFR § 208.12 (permitting an asylum officer to consider information
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materials are aimed at showing whether a particular category
or class of persons has been persecuted in the country in
question on the basis of a protected trait. 58 In addition,
applicants are required to corroborate their claim if they
reasonably can: most cannot. 59
Two weeks after the interview, the applicant will return
to receive the officer’s written decision in person. 60 If the
applicant is not in this country legally, the officer will either
grant asylum or “refer” the applicant to immigration court—a
circumspect way of saying the officer will initiate a removal
case. 61 But if the applicant has a valid legal status, the officer
will either grant or deny asylum. 62 In either situation, there
is no appeal: an applicant’s only remedy from an adverse
decision is to renew her claim before an immigration judge if
the Government attempts to deport her. 63
In 2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the 27,006 claims
they adjudicated, while 50% of were referred to immigration
courts and 3% were denied. 64 Among cases that were

provided by the State Department, by certain other U.S. government offices, or
by “other credible sources, such as international organizations, private
voluntary agencies, news organizations, or academic institutions”).
58. The documentary evidence may also address secondary issues, such as
the possibility of internal relocation. For instance, although Somalia has been
plagued by clan-based civil strife since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in
1991, the U.S. Department of State has long maintained that most Somalis can
safely relocate to a part of the country controlled by their particular clan.
59. See 8 CFR § 208.9(e) (requiring the asylum officer to consider evidence
submitted by an applicant in addition to the application itself).
60. See 8 CFR §§ 208.9 & 19 (requiring an asylum officer to communicate
his or her decision to the applicant in person and in writing); U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services, Asylum Division, Asylum Procedures Manual, § II.K.2.
(November 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
nativedocuments/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf (last visited July 2,
2015) (hereinafter “Asylum Procedures”).
61. See 8 CFR § 208.14(c) (denial, referral, or dismissal of claims by an
asylum officer).
62. 8 CFR § 208.14(c)(2).
63. The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to review asylum
decisions by an immigration judge, but not the decisions of an asylum officer.
See 8 CFR § 1003.1(b) (delineating the Board’s appellate jurisdiction). Federal
courts likewise do not have jurisdiction, primarily because the officer’s decision
is not a final agency adjudication. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d
1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. The asylum office statistics for 2014 are compiled from four separate
quarterly summaries on the U.S.C.I.S. web site. All were last accessed on
February 4, 2016. See Asylum Office Workload January 2014, available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Pre
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“completed” but not “adjudicated,” 65 4,706 were also referred
to immigration courts, while 2,073 were closed. 66 Thus, 54%
of all asylum cases completed by asylum officers in 2014 were
referred to an immigration court, where the applicant was
entitled to de novo consideration of her claim. 67
Immigration court hearings are conducted by the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency
in the Department of Justice (DOJ). 68 The presiding “judge”
is a DOJ lawyer, appointed by the Attorney General to serve
as an administrative judge. 69 In sharp contrast to an asylum
interview, the hearings are adversarial and relatively formal.
The court provides a professional interpreter and creates a
formal record, which includes an audio recording of the
hearing. 70 In fiscal year 2014, 55% of respondents were
represented, 71 and the government is almost always

vious%20Engagements/AffirmativeAsylum_JanuaryFebruaryMarch2014.pdf
(first quarter); Asylum Office Workload April 2014 https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Affirmative_Asylum__April_May_June_2014.pdf (second quarter); Asylum Office Workload July 2014
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20Nationa
l%20Engagements/PED_Affirmative_Asylum_July_August_September_2014.pd
f (third quarter); Asylum Office Workload October 2014 https://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED-AffirmativeAsylum-Oct-NovDec2014.pdf (fourth quarter). Hereinafter, these four documents are collectively
referenced as “2014 Asylum Office Workload.”
65. U.S.C.I.S. regards a case as being “completed” but not “adjudicated” if
the case is referred to an immigration court without an interview; dismissed for
failure to provide fingerprints; or closed because the applicant failed to appear
for an interview. See 2014 Asylum Office Workload, supra note 64.
66. See 2014 Asylum Office Workload, supra note 64. Most of these cases
were closed because the applicant failed to appear for an interview.
67. The percentage was compiled from data in the 2014 Asylum Office
Workload, supra note 64.
68. For an outline of the procedures, see generally 8 CFR § 1240. For more
detail on any aspect of the procedure, see the EOIR Practice Manual, which has
a detailed index.
69. 8 CFR § 1001.1 (l) (defining “immigration judge” as “an attorney whom
the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive
Office of Immigration Review”).
70. See 8 CFR § 1240.9 (requiring a verbatim recording of the proceeding,
including any testimony); EOIR Practice Manual, supra note 15, at 12
(requiring that judges make a digital audio recording of hearings); § 1008.28
(barring the use of any recording equipment in immigration court other than
the equipment used by the judge to create the official record). If either party
appeals, the audio recording of the hearing will be transcribed. See 8 CFR §
1003.5(a) (discussing transcription of the proceedings on appeal to the BIA).
71. Respondents in removal proceeding have a statutory right to counsel of
their choice at no expense to the Government. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). See
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represented. 72
During removal proceedings, an immigration judge must
first determine whether the respondent is subject to
removal. 73 If she is, she is entitled to apply for relief, which
may include benefits other than asylum. 74 Respondents who
previously filed an affirmative asylum application are entitled
to a de novo hearing on their claim. In addition, immigration
judges hear defensive claims for asylum—claims first filed
after a removal case began. In fiscal year 2014, 44% of the
17,997 asylum claims adjudicated by immigration judges
were affirmative, and 56% were defensive. 75 Most (but not
all) of the affirmative claims were adjudicated twice. 76
In most cases, the judge will issue a brief oral decision at
the end of the hearing. 77 Both the applicant and the
government have the right to appeal an adverse decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an administrative
appellate body in DOJ. 78 Finally, the applicant—but not the
also EOIR Practice Manual 19–25 (discussing the right to representation and
the role of counsel). In fiscal year 2014, the immigration courts completed
167,774 cases: of that number, 55% of the respondents were represented.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook A2, K4
(F2) (March 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf) (last visited July 2, 2015)
(hereinafter “EOIR 2014 Yearbook”).
72. See 8 CFR § 1240.2 (delineating the authority and duties of
Government counsel in a removal proceeding). The regulations continue to
refer to “service counsel”—i.e., the counsel of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)—even though the INS no longer exists. Since
2003, Government counsel in removal cases have been employed by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of DHS.
73. See, e.g., RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 14.21 (2015
ed).
74. The INA gives immigration judges broad authority to consider
applications for relief from removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). The judge’s
authority to grant various forms of relief are specified in other provisions of the
INA or by regulation. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (cancellation of removal); 8
C.F.R. § 245 (adjustment of status); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (withholding of removal
and protection under the Convention Against Torture).
75. In 2014, immigration judges granted or denied 17,997 claims, of which
7,955 were affirmative and 10,042 were defensive. Judges granted 75% of the
affirmative claims, but only 28% of the defensive claims. See EOIR 2014
Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3.
76. In FY 2014, 21.6% of the claims referred to immigration courts by
asylum offices had not been adjudicated. See 2014 Asylum Office Workload,
supra note 64.
77. See 8 CFR §§ 1240.12 & 13 (permitting immigration judges to issue an
oral decision). In rare cases, judges will issue a written decision.
78. Under EOIR regulations, any adverse decision by an immigration
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government 79—has the right to appeal an adverse BIA ruling
to the federal Courts of Appeal.
During an asylum hearing, the applicant’s testimony is
the core of her case. The applicant will be examined by her
lawyer, or by the judge if she is unrepresented. She will then
be cross-examined by the government lawyer, and sometimes
the judge as well. 80 The evidentiary rules are more lenient
and more flexible than in other courts—for instance, hearsay
is usually admissible. 81
Beyond the testimony, the record will routinely include:
the written application, the applicant’s declaration, and
background materials on the applicant’s country of
nationality or citizenship. 82 In some cases, the record will
also include an asylum officer’s handwritten notes, or
evidence of other prior statements by the applicant. If the
applicant received a credible fear interview, documents from
that interview will be part of the record.
Much less commonly, applicants present documents or
testimony to corroborate their claim. When available, such
materials typically consist of medical evidence, foreign
government documents, the applicant’s passport, or the
testimony of family members. Some applicants support their
claim with expert testimony, typically on medical issues,
psychological issues, or political and conditions in the
applicant’s home country.
In the great majority of cases, however, there is no direct
evidence to either corroborate or contradict the applicant’s
version of events. This is not surprising: the events took
place in another country; the Government lacks the resources
judge, other than an in absentia order of removal, may be appealed to the BIA.
8 CFR § 1240.15.
79. Because the BIA’s decision is an agency adjudication, government
lawyers are bound to accept it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1240(a)(1) (final orders of removal
are subject to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 158, which provides for review
of federal agency decisions).
80. See 8 CFR § 1003.10(b) (authorizing immigration judges to “interrogate,
examine, and cross-examine” witnesses).
81. See, e.g., Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“in removal proceedings, hearsay is admissible so long as it’s probative and its
use is not fundamentally unfair”).
82. See, e.g., 8 CFR § 1208.11 (authorizing an immigration judge to
consider information from the State Department, including both background
information on country conditions and information specific to the applicant); 8
C.F.R. § 1240.10 (permitting both sides to submit documentary evidence).
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to investigate; and if the applicant is indeed a refugee, she
fled her homeland in fear for her safety. But an applicant’s
inability to corroborate her testimony is not fatal to her claim.
Her testimony alone may be sufficient to meet her burden of
proof if “it is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed
to provide a plausible and coherent account” of the essential
facts. 83
Given this limited evidence, the applicant’s credibility is
the linchpin of the judge’s analysis—asylum is all but certain
to be denied to an applicant who is deemed not credible.84
With that in mind, this Article now turns to the grounds on
which judges typically rely when they make an adverse
credibility finding.
B. The Reasons Why Applicants Are Found Not Credible
For asylum applications filed on or after May 11, 2005,
credibility determinations are governed by statutory
provisions enacted as part of the REAL ID Act. 85 The statute
makes clear that judges must consider “the totality of
circumstances, and all relevant factors.” 86 Relevant factors
include: the demeanor, candor, and responsiveness of the
applicant; the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account;
consistency between the applicant’s written and oral
statements; the internal consistency of each statement; and
the consistency of the applicant’s statements with other
evidence. 87 The statute expressly provides that judges may
consider any “inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood” without
regard to whether the discrepancy “goes to the heart of the
applicant’s claim or any other relevant factor.” 88
83. See, e.g., Biriiac v. Holder, 399 Fed. Appx 27, 35 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987)).
84. Conversely, the fact that an applicant is credible is not enough. For
instance, a judge may conclude that she is telling the truth, but the harm she
fears does not rise to the level of “persecution.”
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The same statute applies to credibility
determinations by an asylum officer. To a large degree the REAL ID Act simply
codified factors immigration judges had long considered on a case-by-case basis.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Prior to the REAL ID Act, some circuits
held that an adverse credibility finding could not be supported by “minor
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of an applicant’s claim.” Kaur v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d
266, 299 (2002).

01 PASKEY FINAL

2016]

5/18/2016 3:49 PM

TELLING REFUGEE STORIES

475

The REAL ID Act also codified a formal corroboration
requirement, one that some courts had previously rejected.
Under that standard, “[w]here the trier of fact determines
that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates
otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
reasonably obtain the evidence.” 89
Which of these factors do immigration judges rely on
most frequently when they find an applicant is not credible?
Because immigration hearings are administrative, it is
possible to provide a detailed, nuanced answer to that
question.
As noted earlier, immigration judges are employed by
DOJ. On appeal to the BIA (also a component of DOJ), their
credibility findings can be reversed only if the BIA
determines the findings were “clearly erroneous.” 90 In a
federal court of appeals, the administrative conclusion that
an applicant is not credible is subject to the substantial
evidence standard. 91 Thus, even before the REAL ID Act was
enacted, federal courts required an immigration judge to
explicitly state the factors supporting a negative credibility
finding. 92 In the words of the Ninth Circuit, an immigration
judge must “provide specific and cogent reasons” for such
findings, 93 and that rule makes it possible to analyze the
factors judges consider.
In 2010, the Courts of Appeals decided over 400 cases 94
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
90. 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(i).
91. See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 334 n. 13
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Second Circuit uses the substantial evidence
standard, but suggesting that the standard of review in immigration cases may
be even more deferential).
92. See, e.g., Gui v. I.N.S., 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002) (an
immigration judge “must have a legitimate articulable basis to question the
petitioner’s credibility”); Secaida-Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.
2003) (“Adverse credibility determinations based on speculation or conjecture,
rather than on evidence in the record, are reversible.”); Ahmad v. I.N.S., 163
F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Credibility determinations are accorded
substantial deference, but they must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.”)
93. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gui,
280 F.3d at 1225).
94. It should be noted that a significant percentage of asylum applicants do
not have a lawyer during their immigration court hearing, and that many
unrepresented applicants do not appeal an adverse decision to federal courts.
See Refugee Roulette, supra note 43 at 325. Nonetheless, there is no obvious
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(both published and unpublished) in which they reviewed an
immigration judge’s conclusion that an asylum applicant was
not credible. Of those, 369 clearly state the reasons for the
judge’s negative credibility finding. Under a research project
funded by the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, each of
those decisions was reviewed, and the reasons judges gave for
their negative credibility findings were tabulated. The data
are fully summarized in the Appendix, which includes eight
separate tables.
As detailed in Table 2, the factors relied on by judges
were divided into three distinct groups. The first set of
factors consisted of internal inconsistencies in the applicant’s
story, including inconsistent testimony during the hearing;
inconsistencies between the applicant’s testimony and
declaration, and inconsistencies between the testimony and
other prior statements. The second set involved aspects of
the way the story was told, including the applicant’s
demeanor and other concerns, such as whether the
applicant’s story was deemed to be “vague” or “implausible.”
The final set of factors includes anything external to the
applicant’s story, including inconsistencies between the story
and other evidence as well as an applicant’s failure to
corroborate her claim.
In 76% of cases, judges cited some combination of two to
four of these factors in support of their adverse credibility
findings. Only sixty-four decisions (17%) cited a single factor,
most commonly inconsistencies between the applicant’s
testimony and either the written declaration or evidence
external to the applicant’s story. (See Table 8.)
Five key points emerge from this research. First, an
applicant who is found to be not credible will almost certainly
lose her case on appeal. In a remarkable 96% of the cases, an
appeals court affirmed the immigration judge’s negative
credibility finding and the decision denying asylum. 95 Twelve
reason to believe inconsistencies within and among the applicant’s statements
would play a lesser role in such cases. Indeed, in one respect an unrepresented
asylum seeker may have an advantage: if there is no written declaration, a
judge cannot find that the applicant’s testimony and declaration are
inconsistent.
95. Of the 369 cases examined, 354 were affirmed. See Table 1, infra. In the
remaining 15 cases, the appeals court vacated the administration decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. In at least one case, the court
explicitly concluded that the applicant was credible, and directed the BIA to
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of the fifteen remands were in the Ninth Circuit, where 86%
of cases were affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit remanded two
cases; the Second Circuit remanded one. In every other
circuit, all cases were affirmed.
Second, immigration judges overwhelmingly expect that
credible applicants will tell a consistent story. Internal
inconsistencies within and among an applicant’s written and
oral statements are by far the dominant factor in negative
credibility findings. Judges relied on some combination of
these inconsistencies in 86% of the cases—roughly seven
cases out of every eight. 96
Third, the applicant’s ability to testify consistently with
her declaration is critical. In 56% of cases, the immigration
judge’s negative credibility finding relied on inconsistencies
between the applicant’s oral testimony and her written
declaration. In 47% of cases, judges relied on inconsistencies
within the applicant’s testimony itself.
Inconsistencies
between the testimony and other prior statements were cited
in 28% of cases. 97 In this last group of cases, the evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement often was limited to an asylum
officer’s notes. In other cases, the prior statement was
created as part of a credible fear interview.
Fourth, judges also give significant weight to the way an
applicant’s story is told.
Judges cited the applicant’s
demeanor in 18% of all cases. In 23% of all cases, judges also
relied on other traits of the applicant’s testimony. 98 Judges
who did so frequently described the applicant’s testimony as
“implausible,” “vague,” “lacking in detail,” “unresponsive,” or
“evasive.” Less frequently, judges described an applicant’s
testimony
as
“confusing,”
“hesitant,”
“disjointed,”
“incoherent,” or “unreliable.” 99
Finally, the presence or absence of other evidence was
important, but much less so than inconsistencies in the
applicant’s story. Inconsistencies between the applicant’s
testimony and other evidence were cited in 46% of cases, but

reconsider its decision in light of that finding. Singh v. Holder, 406 Fed. Appx.
166, 171 (9th Cir. 2010).
96. See Tables 2 and 3, infra.
97. See Table 3, infra.
98. See Table 7, infra.
99. Unpublished research notes by Brendan McCullen (undated) (on file
with the author).
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in 70% of those cases the judge also relied on inconsistencies
in the applicant’s oral or written statements. Similarly,
judges cited the absence of corroborating evidence in 43% of
cases, but in 85% of those cases they also relied on
inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements. In only 13% of
cases did a judge conclude that an applicant who told her
story consistently was not credible, most often because the
testimony was inconsistent with other evidence.
The data are subject to certain limitations. Many asylum
cases are not appealed to the BIA, and only a fraction of those
cases are further appealed to the circuit courts. Moreover,
the federal court decisions are weighted in favor of applicants
with a lawyer: those who are not represented are less likely to
appeal an adverse decision.
Nonetheless, the decisions in these cases reflect a
cultural norm: in the United States (and elsewhere), it is
widely assumed that consistent statements are central to
credibility, and that a person whose story changes over time
is not truthful. But as discussed in detail below, when the
person is a trauma survivor, that assumption is not true.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF STORIES: NARRATIVE, STORY, AND
DISCOURSE
Before considering the research on trauma and the
effects of trauma on the stories told by survivors, it would be
useful to step back and consider several questions: What do
we mean by “story”? Why must an asylum applicant tell one?
And what is the relationship between the “credibility” of a
storyteller and the way the story is told? The answers to
those questions are useful to an understanding of the
challenges faced by survivors who seek asylum, the criteria
by which we judge their credibility, and the ways in which a
declaration drafted by a lawyer will differ from an applicant’s
testimony.
In a typical legal trial, the parties tell competing stories
and present other evidence, and a trier of fact must determine
whether one story or the other is true, or whether the truth
lies between the two. But when there is only one story and no
other evidence of the applicant’s experience—as there is with
most claims for asylum—the applicant’s credibility becomes a
proxy for the truth, even though a story that does not conform
to our norms for a credible story may, in fact, be true. To help
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explain precisely why that can happen, this Article will
explore the ways narrative theorists think about the
structure of stories, especially the distinction between story
and discourse—in lay terms, between the content of a story
and the form in which it is told.
At first blush, the idea of a “story” may seem obvious. A
story is simply the “telling” of something that happened, an
account of one or more events for which there is some sort of
change or transformation—a “before” and an “after.” 100 If the
story includes more than one event, the events will be related
both logically and chronologically. The events are caused or
experienced by characters, and there are places in which the
events take place. But literary theorists have long recognized
that even a simple story can be deceptively complex. In the
19th century, one scholar counted more than one thousand
versions of the “Cinderella story.” 101 What makes each of
these versions the “same” story, and how do we account for
the differences?
In the language of structuralist narrative theory, each
distinct telling of a story is a separate narrative text (or
narrative) 102 and each narrative can be divided into two parts:
story and discourse. 103 The demarcation between story and
discourse has been characterized as a distinction between
“content” and “expression,” 104 or between “plot” and
“presentation.” 105
At the level of story, a narrative text contains elements
known as events and existents. 106 The latter term includes,
100. Some narrative theorists argue that a single event does not suffice to
make a story. See H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO
NARRATIVE 15–16 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing definitions of “story”).
101. Id. at 21.
102. In this context, the word “text” is used broadly and may refer to stories
that are told through a medium other than oral or written language. A story
told, for instance, through dance, mime, or a silent film would also be
considered a narrative “text,” so long as it has “narrativity,” the qualities that
distinguish a narrative from other forms of expression. See generally, Abbott,
supra note 92, at 1–12 (discussing the universality of narrative).
103. See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 16–20; SEYMOUR CHATWIN, STORY
AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION AND FILM 19-21 (1978).
104. CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19.
105. JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
81 (1997). Culler’s use of the word “plot” in this sense is potentially problematic:
the same term is used in other (and sometimes conflicting) ways by other
theorists.
106. CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19, 34.
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among other things, the characters who cause or experience
events, the places where events happen, and various things
that are present. 107 Hamlet’s murder of his uncle Claudius is
an event: the two men, the poisoned sword, and the court at
Elsinore are existents. The category of events is further
divided into actions and happenings—events caused by a
character and those that are not. 108 The rebuilding of a home
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina is an action, the storm itself
a happening.
The term discourse, by contrast, refers to the way a story
is communicated to an audience. It consists not only of the
medium in which the story is told (as a written text, a video,
or a live performance), but also a myriad of traits concerning
the style and manner of expression. Among them: the
perspective from which the story is told, the choice to include
or omit various events and characters, the order and pacing of
events, and the level of detail in which events and characters
are described. If a narrative includes flashbacks, those shifts
in time are part of the discourse: events need not be
presented in the order in which they happened.
The distinction between narrative, story, and discourse is
essential to convey a basic truth about storytelling: a single
story can be told multiple ways from different perspectives in
different media and for different purposes to different
audiences. Kirosawa’s landmark film Rashomon is a striking
example. The story’s events center on the rape of a woman
and the killing of her samurai husband after the couple
encounter a bandit. During the film, the wife, the bandit, and
the dead samurai’s spirit each tell the story in different ways,
and each claims to be the killer. A woodcutter who witnessed
the events gives a fourth account, inconsistent with the
others. 109
But even when a story is told without contradiction from
one perspective, the discourse may vary sharply. The events
underlying L. Frank Baum’s The Wizard of Oz have been told

107. CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19, 44–45.
108. CHATWIN, supra note 103, at 19.
109. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Rashomon, available at https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Rashomon (summarizing the film’s plot) (last visited June 15, 2015);
Roger Ebert, Rashomon, available at http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/greatmovie-rashomon-1950 (reviewing the film and discussing its cultural impact)
(last visted June 15, 2015).

01 PASKEY FINAL

2016]

5/18/2016 3:49 PM

TELLING REFUGEE STORIES

481

as a novel, a film, and two Broadway musicals, Wiz and
Wicked. 110 Each version is a separate narrative, in which the
story is told through a different discourse. As the Cinderella
example demonstrates, the potential variations in discourse
are all but limitless.
Discussions of narrative theory most often focus on
fictional narratives, but the distinction between narrative
text, story, and discourse applies equally to nonfiction
narratives. For nonfiction, however, there is an additional
trait. As Doritt Cohn explains, a work of fiction is a nonreferential (or self-referential) narrative: the text itself
creates the world to which it refers by referring to it, and that
world has no existence outside the text. 111 A work of
nonfiction, on the other hand, is a referential narrative, one
that makes reference to, and is bounded by, a world that
exists beyond and independently from the text. 112 In Cohn’s
model, this world beyond the text is the reference.
Cohn recognized that fictional works need not be entirely
self-referential. They may (and often do) refer to actual
places, events, or characters. 113 But while fiction can refer to
the world outside the text, it does not do so exclusively, and
references to that world are not bound to accuracy. As a
result, a work of nonfiction is subject to judgments about
“truth” or “falsity,” but a work of fiction is not, and some
narratives occupy a murky middle ground, part fiction and
part fact. 114
But whether a narrative is “true” cannot be determined
simply by examining the discourse. As H. Porter Abbott has
suggested, fiction can readily imitate fact and there is no
textual property that can identify a narrative as a work of
fiction. 115 Instead, a narrative’s truth can be assessed only by

110. Wikipedia, Adaptations of The Wizard of Oz, available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptations_of_The_Wizard_of_Oz (last visted
June 15, 2015).
111. See DORITT COHN, THE DISTINCTION OF FICTION 12–14 (1989).
112. Id. at 14–15.
113. Id. at 15. For instance, Elliot Roosevelt, the son of Franklin D. and
Eleanor Roosevelt, wrote a series of novels casting his famous mother as a
crime-solving detective, with titles like Murder in the Lincoln Bedroom. Elliot
Roosevelt, ELLIOT ROOSEVELT’S MURDER IN THE LINCOLN BEDROOM: AN
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT MYSTERY (2000).
114. COHN, supra note 111 , at 15.
115. See ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 149. For an excellent discussion of the
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evaluating statements in the narrative against other
evidence. Complete and perfect accuracy is not possible. 116
The application of these distinctions to claims for asylum
is straightforward and useful.
An applicant’s written
declaration is one narrative, while her testimony is another.
They each intend to tell the same story, but the discourse is
different, and any discrepancy between the two raises critical
questions. How and why are they different? Are the
differences a matter of story or discourse? To what degree has
the applicant’s story been shaped by a lawyer’s involvement,
or by the applicant’s physical and mental state each time the
story was told? And ultimately, there is this: to what
degree—if any—do the differences tell us anything about the
“truth” of the story or the credibility of the storyteller?
Whether the applicant’s story is true depends on the
relationship between the narrative and the reference—
between the events of the story and events in the world. But
without other evidence, how can an immigration judge verify
the elements of the story, or determine whether the applicant
has accurately represented what happened?
The answer, of course, is that the judge can never know
what truly happened. Because the judge has no firsthand
knowledge of the reference and no other evidence of the
reference, the judge’s conclusions about the “truth” of the
story must rely on the story itself and how that story is told to
determine whether the judge believes the applicant is
credible. In short, the applicant’s credibility becomes a
surrogate for the story’s truth.
For asylum seekers, their lawyers, and others who assist
them, the challenges presented by this situation are
inescapable. In the context of legal practice, storytelling is
not optional, nor is it merely a rhetorical tactic or persuasive
technique; it is, quite literally, required by the nature of legal
rules. 117 Both lawyers and the public think of law in terms of

issues relating to narrative and truth, see id. at 145–58.
116. As Abbott notes, historians and biographers must deal with an
incomplete record, and what audiences expect from a nonfiction narrative is not
so much the complete and literal truth as a good faith attempt to accurately
represent the way things are (or were). See ABBOTT, supra note 100, at 146.
117. See generally Stephen Paskey, The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the
False Dichotomy Between Stories & Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC:
JAWLD 51 (2014).
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rules and logic, but all governing legal rules—the rules by
which a decision maker can confer a benefit or impose a
penalty—have the structure of a stock story, a story in which
the elements (characters, events, and consequences) have
been stripped to a bare minimum and stated in general
terms. The “rags to riches” stories penned by Horatio Alger
are classic examples. Though the characters and events
change, in each of Alger’s stories a poor young boy achieves
success through hard work and good character.
In the same way, the legal standard for asylum is also a
stock story, a set of logically-related elements with
characters, events, and a change of circumstances. To meet
her burden of proof, the applicant must prove, among other
things, that she left her country of nationality, and that she is
unwilling or unable to return because of past persecution or a
“well-founded fear” of future persecution. She cannot do so
except by telling a story, in which she and those who would
persecute her are the central characters.
But what happens to storytelling when the storyteller
has experienced or witnessed a traumatic event? This Article
now turns to that question.
III. THE IMPACT OF TRAUMA ON STORYTELLING
As some theorists have recognized, storytelling is a
rhetorical act: stories are told to a particular audience for a
But immigration courts are not
particular purpose. 118
intended to be a therapeutic environment, and the goals of
the adjudication process differ from those of therapy.
As Schulamit Almog explains, the “poetics” of legal
stories are different from those of trauma literature: “Law
demands orderly, ‘closed’ stories, and has a valid reason for
this demand.” Legal stories are normative, and the narrative
in judgments “does not interpret reality or contemplate
reality; rather, it declares that a particular occurrence is
reality.” 119 But the “literature” of trauma is “indifferent” to
118. See, e.g., James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz, Narrative as Rhetoric, in
David Herman et al., NARRATIVE THEORY: CORE CONCEPTS & CRITICAL
DEBATES 3, 5 (2012). Under their definition, “[n]arrative is somebody telling
somebody else, on some occasion, and for some purposes, that something
happened to someone or something.”
119. Shulamit Almog, Healing Stories in Law and Literature, TRAUMA AND
MEMORY: READING, HEALING AND MAKING LAW 289, 298 (Austin Sarat, Nadav
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the needs of law: outside the courtroom, trauma narratives
are “created first and foremost to serve its narrators, the
trauma survivors.” 120 This inherent tension between the
needs of the law and the psychological needs of survivors lies
at the very heart of the challenges faced by trauma survivors
who seek asylum. And if the system by which their stories
are evaluated does not reliably account for this tension, the
results can be tragic.
Most immigration judges understand that an applicant
who suffers from psychological trauma may have difficulty
“telling” her story. They know it is hard for people to talk
about traumatic events, and that doing so may trigger painful
memories or feelings.
But the impact of trauma on
storytelling is deeper and far more complex. It will certainly
impact a survivor’s demeanor and memory, but it may also
introduce a large degree of uncertainly, even with regard to
the central details of the survivor’s story. And when the
survivor’s story is the only evidence of what happened—as it
is in most claims for asylum—the legal consequences can be
severe. To understand how and why our system of asylum
adjudication necessarily fails survivors, it is critical to explore
the effects of trauma on storytelling in depth.
A. The Nature and Symptoms of Trauma
The word “trauma,” in a psychological sense, is usually
associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but
the meaning is broader. 121 The word originally was used in
medicine to denote “a sudden physical blow or injury.” 122
Much later, it was borrowed by psychiatry123 “to designate a
blow to the self (and to the tissues of the mind), a shock that
creates a psychological split or rupture, an emotional
Psychological trauma begins with an
injury. . .” 124
Davidovich & Michal Alberstein eds., 2008).
120. Id.
121. As Herman explains, “[t]here is a spectrum of traumatic disorders,
ranging from the effects of a single overwhelming event to the more complicated
effects of prolonged and repeated abuse.” HERMAN, supra note 1, at 3.
122. Almog, supra note 119, at 298.
123. Serious research on trauma originated in the late 19th century with the
study of a “disorder” among women then known as “hysteria.” For a detailed
discussion of the history, see Herman, supra, note 1 at 10–32.
124. SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS 171 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press 2012).
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“extraordinary” event, one that “overwhelm[s] the ordinary
human adaptations to life.” 125 Such events typically involve
threats of death or serious bodily harm, or a “personal
encounter with violence and death,” including the death of
others. 126 The common denominator is a feeling of “intense
fear, helplessness, loss of control, and threat of
annihilation.” 127 As Judith Herman explains, the salient
characteristic of the traumatic event is its power to inspire
“helplessness and terror.” 128
While much of the study of trauma has centered on war
veterans and survivors of child abuse or sexual abuse, 129 the
symptoms of trauma are also widespread among “forcibly
displaced persons”—a group that includes refugees. 130
Research has shown that refugees are ten times more likely
to suffer from PTSD than the general population in the
Before they were
countries where they’ve resettled. 131
displaced, refugees often experienced prolonged detention,
severe violence, torture, or the death of family, friends, or
associates.
After displacement, they may experience
additional risk factors for trauma, including arduous
migration, the shock of resettlement in an unfamiliar culture,
and stresses related to employment, finances, and their
uncertain immigration status. 132
The general symptoms of trauma fall into three broad
125. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
126. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
127. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33 (citing N.C. Andreasen, Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, in Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 918-24 (H.I. Kaplan
and B.J. Sadock, eds., 4th ed. 1985).
128. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
129. See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 20-32 (discussing the history of research
on psychological trauma among war veterans and domestic abuse survivors);
96-114 (discussing research on child sexual abuse).
130. See, e.g., Farah Husain, et al., Prevalence of War-Related Mental Health
Conditions and Association With Displacement Status in Postwar Jaffna
District, Sri Lanka, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 522 (2011) (finding high rates of
PTSD and other mental health conditions among persons displaced by war in
Sri Lanka); Andrés J. Pumariega, Eugenio Rothe, and JoAnne B. Pumariega,
Mental Health of Immigrants and Refugees, 41 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J.
581, 588 (2005) (concluding that refugees are at high risk for depression,
anxiety, and PTSD).
131. Fazel M, et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees
Resettled in Western Countries: A Systematic Review, 365 LANCET 1309 (2005).
132. See Crumlish and O’Rourke, A Systematic Review of Treatments for
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, 198 J OF
NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 237 (2010).
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categories. The first is hyperarousal: the nervous system
“seems to go onto permanent alert, as if the danger might
return at any moment.” 133 As a result, many survivors sleep
poorly, startle easily, and “react irritably to small
provocations.” 134 The second category of symptoms, intrusion,
is perhaps the best known to laypersons. Survivors often
“relive” traumatic events as though they were happening in
the present. The experience of traumatic events “becomes
encoded in an abnormal form of memory, which breaks
spontaneously into consciousness, both as flashbacks during
waking states and traumatic nightmares during sleep.” 135
The experience of intrusion goes beyond simply remembering
what happened: it “carries with it the emotional intensity of
the original event,” and survivors go to great lengths to avoid
it. 136
The third class of symptoms is known as constriction or
numbing. Robert J. Lifton found “psychic numbing” to be
almost universal in survivors of war and called it a “paralysis
of the mind.” 137 In contrast to intrusion, survivors are aware
of the present, but their perceptions and responses are
altered, and their present experience may lose the qualities of
ordinary reality, as if events are happening to someone
else. 138 In Herman’s words, “[t]hese perceptual changes
combine with a feeling of indifference, emotional detachment,
and profound passivity . . .” 139
Survivors often oscillate between intrusion and numbing,
between reliving events and experiencing nothing. 140 Herman
calls this “the dialectic of trauma,” a complicated rhythm in
which a survivor “finds herself caught between the extremes
of amnesia or reliving the trauma, between floods of intense,
overwhelming feeling and arid states of no feeling at all,
between irritable, impulsive action and complete inhibition of
Beyond these cardinal symptoms, traumatic
action.” 141
133. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 35.
134. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 35.
135. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
136. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 42.
137. Robert Jay Lifton, Beyond Psychic Numbing: A Call to Awareness, 52
AM J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 619 (October 1982).
138. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
139. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
140. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
141. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 47.
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events often have a deeper, existential impact: they can
undermine a survivor’s belief systems, “violate the victim’s
faith in a natural or divine order,” and “shatter the
construction of the self that is formed and sustained in
relation to others.” 142
B. The Impact of Trauma on a Survivor’s Story
Stories are central to the way human beings construct a
sense of self, and the experience of trauma has a profound
impact on a survivor’s ability to tell her story. Our ability to
describe the past relies on memory, but the memories left by
traumatic events are different from those of day-to-day living.
In contrast to ordinary memories, traumatic memories are
not encoded “in a verbal, linear narrative that is assimilated
into an ongoing life story.” 143 Instead, they leave an “indelible
image,” 144 whereby events are “encoded in the form of vivid
sensations and images.” 145 In other words, a survivor’s
memory is “imprinted” with the sensory data from the
traumatic event—the sights, sounds, smells, and bodily
sensations—but without the linguistic narrative structure
that gives a person’s ordinary memories a sense of logical and
chronological coherence.
Because stories are key to the construction of self, they
also play a critical role in the process of healing. Herman
divides recovery into three distinct stages, each with a
different task: the establishment of safety; remembrance and
In
mourning; and reconnection with ordinary life. 146
Herman’s second stage, the survivor learns to tell her story
completely, repeatedly, and in detail. 147 A survivor suffering
from the symptoms of trauma may begin by telling a story
that is “repetitious, stereotyped, and emotionless.” 148 If a
survivor can tell her story at all (some cannot), the character
of traumatic memory often results in a narrative that is

142. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 51.
143. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
144. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 38 (citing ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE CONCEPT
OF THE SURVIVOR, IN SURVIVORS, VICTIMS, AND PERPETRATORS: ESSAYS ON THE
NAZI HOLOCAUST 113 (Joel E. Dimsdale ed. 1980)).
145. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 38.
146. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 155.
147. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175.
148. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 175.
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incomplete, incoherent, fragmented, and chronologically
fractured. 149
Even laypersons understand that a trauma survivor may
have difficulty telling her story. Note the use of language
here: the manner in which a story is told is the discourse and
not the story itself. Whether a person was raped once or
three times is story: each rape is a separate event. Whether
the description of the events is vague, repetitious, or
emotionless is discourse. But the symptoms of trauma do not
affect only the discourse: they also affect the underlying story,
the events and characters that form the content of a
narrative. We assume the details of a “true” story will not
change over time, but Herman emphasizes that this
assumption does not hold for the stories told by survivors:
[B]oth patient and therapist must develop tolerance for
some degree of uncertainty, even regarding the basic facts
of the story. In the course of recovery, the story may
change, even as missing pieces are recovered. . . . Thus,
both patient and therapist must accept the fact that they
do not have a complete knowledge, and must learn to live
with ambiguity while exploring at a tolerable pace. 150

The pace of this work is often slow, and the process of
constructing a full and detailed account is challenging. The
survivor may become agitated or withdrawn; she may find it
increasingly difficult to use words; she may suffer intrusive
flashbacks; and to avoid the difficulties (and the pain) “[s]he
may insist that the therapist validate a partial and
incomplete version of events without further exploration.” 151
And because the “truth” can be difficult to face, survivors
“often vacillate in reconstructing their stories,” and they may
be “ambivalen[t] about truth-telling.” 152
The impact of trauma on memory and storytelling has
been explored extensively in certain groups of trauma
survivors. For instance, the narratives told by Holocaust
survivors are often described as “fractured,” “fragmented,”
In some instances, the
“disrupted,” or “interrupted.” 153
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 177; Almog, supra note 119, at 426.
HERMAN, supra note 1, at 179-80.
HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180–81.
HERMAN, supra note 1, at 181.
See, e.g., Shulamit Almog, Healing Stories in Law and Literature, in
TRAUMA AND MEMORY: READING, HEALING, AND MAKING LAW 289, 293 (Austin
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memories are simply too painful to recall, even after decades
have passed. 154 Among women who have been sexually
abused, there is a tendency to revise the story over time, a
phenomenon Kim Lane Scheppele calls “shifting stories.” 155
As Schepple explains, “abused women frequently repress
what happened; they cannot speak; they hesitate, waver and
procrastinate; they hope the abuse will go away; [and] they
cover up for their abusers . . .” 156 These actions “produce
delayed or altered stories, which are then disbelieved for the
very reason that they have been revised.” 157
The critical point—that the stories of trauma survivors
change over time, even with regard to central details—has
been proven by empirical research. In a 2006 article, British
researchers Jane Herlihy and Stuart Turner describe a
careful study in which thirty-nine refugees from Kosovo and
Bosnia were interviewed on two occasions about two events in
their past, one traumatic and one non-traumatic. 158 At the
outset, the refugees were assessed for PTSD, and all
exhibited symptoms of trauma in varying degrees. 159 All
participants had been granted refugee status in the United
Kingdom, and they had given accounts of the traumatic
events in the course of obtaining that status. 160
The time between the two interviews ranged from three
to thirty-two weeks. 161 During the interviews, each refugee
was asked an identical set of questions, and was also asked to
rate particular details as being either “central” or
“peripheral” to their experience. Differences between the
interviews were noted, and researchers then calculated
“discrepancy rates” for each refugee, with four separate
Sarat, et al., eds., 2007). For a book length discussion of oral testimonies by
Holocaust survivors, see generally Lawrence Langer, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES:
THE RUINS OF MEMORY (1993).
154. See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 86-95 (discussing the effects of prolonged
captivity).
155. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence,
Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 141
(1992).
156. Scheppele, supra note 155 at 126-27.
157. Id. at 127.
158. Jane Herlihy & Stuart Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by
Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE 81 (2006).
159. Id. at 87-88.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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calculations depending on whether the discrepancies involved
the traumatic or non-traumatic event, and whether the
details in question were central or peripheral. 162
The results of the research are striking. Though the
discrepancy rate was higher for peripheral details, the rate
for central details was far higher than a layperson might
expect: for traumatic events, there were discrepancies in
roughly 30% of the central details. 163 Though the authors
give little information on the precise nature of the
discrepancies, the descriptions they do provide suggest the
discrepancies they found were precisely the sort of things an
immigration judge might deem significant. For instance,
during his first interview one participant said he was
“slapped around” by military police. During the second, he
said he was “badly beaten.” 164
The length of time between interviews was also an
important factor: for refugees with high levels of PTSD, the
overall discrepancy rate doubled when there was a long delay
As the authors emphasize, if
between interviews. 165
discrepancies are used as a factor in credibility
determinations, then asylum seekers who suffer from PTSD
at the time of their final interview or hearing “are
systematically more likely to be rejected the longer their
application takes.” 166 In light of those findings, Herlihy &
Turner reach an unequivocal conclusion: “the assumption
that discrepancies necessarily indicate a fabricated story is
incorrect.” 167
C. The Testimony Method of Trauma Therapy
Despite the challenges survivors face, the act of telling
the story can be critical to a survivor’s recovery, so much so
that a form of therapy has developed around the process. In
the 1980s, Chilean psychologists who worked with torture
survivors created the “testimony method,” also known as

162. Id.
163. Id. at 88. Because the data are presented as a graph rather than a
table, a more precise figure is not available.
164. Herlihy & Turner, supra note 158 at 89.
165. Id.
166. Herlihy & Turner, Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum
Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit?, 16 TORTURE at 90
167. Id. at 89.
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testimonial therapy. 168 Subsequent research has used the
method with Holocaust survivors, 169 recent refugees in the
United States 170 and the Netherlands, 171 and torture
survivors in India. 172
Testimonial therapy is not a single procedure, but a
practice used “in many variations and settings.” 173
Nonetheless, some features are common. The method’s
“central project” is to create a written account of the patient’s
experience. In most studies, the therapy took place during six
to twelve weekly or bi-weekly sessions. 174 Therapy sessions
are recorded and transcribed, and the resulting document is
revised until the patient’s fragmented recollections have been
assembled into a complete whole. 175 In many studies, the
process ended with a “delivery ritual,” in which the final
written version of the story was signed by the patient and
copies were given to family members or human rights
groups. 176
A pilot study among Bosnian refugees in the United
States illustrates the process. In that study, the treatment
involved six sessions of ninety minutes each. 177 For each

168. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 182; A. Cienfuegos & C Monelli, The
Testimony of Political Repression as a Therapeutic Instrument, 53 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 43 (1983).
169. Raul D. Strous, et al., Video Testimony of Long-term Hospitalized
Psychiatrically Ill Holocaust Survivors, 162 AM. J. OF PSYCH. 2287 (Dec. 2005).
170. Stevan M. Weine, et al., Testimonial Therapy in Bosnian Refugees: A
Pilot Study, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1720 (1998).
171. Janie A. Van Dijk, et al., Testimony Therapy: Treatment Method for
Traumatized Victims of Organized Violence, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 361
(2003).
172. Inger Agger, et al., Testimonial Therapy: A Pilot Project to Improve
Psychological Well-Being Among Survivors of Torture in India, 19 TORTURE 204
(2009).
173. Id. at 210.
174. See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721 (six sessions of 90
minutes each); Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 363 (12 sessions); Agger, et
al., supra note 172, at 211 (4 sessions of 90–120 minutes each). One study used
only one or two sessions of 60 minutes each, but the authors of that study found
no significant difference between the study participants and a control group.
Victor Igreja, et al., Testimony Method to Ameliorate Post-Traumatic Stress
Symptoms: Community-based Intervention with Mozambican Civil War
Survivors, 184 THE BRITISH J. OF PSYCHIATRY 251, 252-54 (2004).
175. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 182.
176. See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722; Van Dijk, et al., supra
note 171, at 362.
177. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721.
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survivor, testimony was not limited to traumatic events—
rather, there was a “constant emphasis upon 1) the [refugee’s]
life history, 2) the social context of life, and 3) the sense of self
in history and history in one’s life.” 178 Once this “initial
frame” was set, the interviewer asked “succinct, open-ended,
and clarifying questions” about the patient’s experience, and
provided “support and structure” to help the survivor give an
full account of the events. 179 At the end of the therapy, a
written account was read to the survivor, who corrected
mistakes or added details. Two copies of the final version
were signed, with one going to the survivor and the second to
an oral history archive. 180
In virtually all reported studies, authors found a
significant improvement in the psychological wellbeing of
participants. 181 When the study of Bosnian refugees began,
for instance, all participants had been formally diagnosed
with PTSD. 182 A six-month follow-up found that 47% of the
participants no longer suffered from PTSD, while the
frequency and severity of symptoms in other participants
substantially decreased. 183 In explaining similar findings, the
authors of another study emphasized that “a main
characteristic of trauma is the inability to talk about the
traumatic experiences without being flooded by them.” 184 By
giving survivors gradual and supportive exposure to painful
memories, they theorized, testimonial therapy decreases the
main symptoms—”avoidance and re-experiencing”—and helps
survivors discuss and re-evaluate their experiences. 185
IV. THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS, REVISITED
Trauma survivors often appear in legal proceedings, most
frequently in cases involving rape, sexual abuse, or domestic
178. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722.
179. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722.
180. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722.
181. See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722–23 (reporting a
substantial decrease in the rates of PTSD and the frequency and severity of
symptoms with no negative effects); Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 367 ;
Agger, et al., supra note 172, at 204 (after therapy, all participants
demonstrated “significant improvement” on a well-being index).
182. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721.
183. Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1722.
184. Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 368.
185. Van Dijk, et al., supra note 171, at 368.
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violence. 186 And yet, in important ways, trauma is uniquely
situated in claims for asylum. It is uniquely situated in part
because an applicant must prove that the persecution she
suffered was sufficiently severe to constitute persecution, and
the trauma itself is evidence of that fact. It is also different
because the opposing party (the Government) rarely has
evidence of its own. It is not a matter of “he said / she said,”
but simply one of “he or she said.” And it is different because
the balance of interests is weighed so overwhelmingly to one
side. For instance, in a criminal case involving rape or sexual
abuse, a court must balance the possible harm to the alleged
victim with the harm of a wrongful conviction. But in an
asylum case, the Government truly has little at stake: the
consequences of erroneously granting asylum are de minimus.
What this means, quite simply, is that survivors who
seek asylum must confront challenges for which there is no
direct precedent in the U.S. legal system. With a focused
understanding of both narrative theory and research on
trauma narratives, this Article now turns to those challenges.
A. The Challenges Faced By Survivors Who Seek Asylum
Consider again the hypothetical case with which this
Article began. The applicant has testified that she was
arrested, imprisoned, and raped. If her testimony is true, the
odds are extremely high that she suffers from psychological
trauma: rape, like torture or prolonged detention, is the sort
of event that typically results in trauma. But the applicant
has no evidence to corroborate her testimony, and thus her
claim for asylum will turn almost entirely on whether the
judge believes she is credible.

186. A detailed discussion of legal and judicial responses to trauma in
domestic violence cases is beyond the scope of this article. For a general
overview of the challenges presented by domestic violence cases and responses
to those challenges, see, e.g., Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence
Representation, 101 Ky. L.J. 483, 542 (2013); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2002) ; Lisa A.
Goodman & Deborah Epstein, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVORCENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE (2008). On
the specific issue of addressing the effects of trauma, Carolyn Copps Hartley
has proposed various reforms grounded in principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence. Carolyn Copps Hartley, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach
to the Trial Process in Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 410 (2003).
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If she filed an affirmative application and has a lawyer,
she will tell her story orally no fewer than five times over a
period spanning more than one year. 187 At a minimum, the
applicant will tell her story when she first meets with her
lawyer, during her asylum interview and the immigration
court hearing, and while she and her lawyer prepare for both
the interview hearing. In addition, very early in the process,
the applicant will sign a written version of her story drafted
by the lawyer.
In the end, a judge will consider at least two versions of
her story: the first version, as retold in writing by a lawyer,
and the last version, as told orally by the applicant herself.
In the process of making a credibility finding, the judge will
assess whether the two versions are internally consistent and
consistent with each other, and whether the applicant’s story
is detailed, plausible, and coherent. A negative credibility
finding will be fatal to the applicant’s claim, and the deck will
be stacked against her in three distinct ways.
First, nearly all of the criteria used to assess credibility
are unreliable when applied to the stories told by trauma
survivors. As dictated by Congress, an immigration judge’s
credibility assessment will be based on the applicant’s
demeanor, candor, and responsiveness, as well as on the
inherent plausibility of her story, the consistency between her
written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each
statement, and the consistency of her statements with other
evidence. 188 Many of these factors are a matter of discourse
rather than story, and if the applicant is a trauma survivor,
only the final factor—the consistency of her statements with
other evidence—has any real bearing on the truth of her
claim.
As emphasized earlier, adverse credibility findings are
frequently based on inconsistencies in the applicant’s story,
and yet such inconsistencies are routine—and should be

187. In fiscal year 2014, the immigration courts received 225,896 new cases
and completed 184,322 cases. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at B1-B2.
At the end of that year, the immigration courts had a backlog of 418,861
pending cases. Id. at W1. As those figures make clear, many cases are not
completed in a year’s time; some will take many years. See, e.g., Zeru, 503 F.3d
at 64 (asylum claim denied seven years after immigration court proceedings
began, and over four years after testimony was first taken).
188. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
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expected—when trauma survivors tell their story. Moreover,
factors such as demeanor, vagueness, responsiveness, and
even “plausibility” are not reliable measures of truthfulness
when applied to trauma survivors. In Sanga v. Gonzales, for
instance, an asylum applicant testified that government
soldiers came to his family’s home, shot his father, and raped
his sister while he hid in the bathroom with his mother. In
the course of finding that he was not credible, the judge
opined that it was not a “logical human response” for the
applicant to remain hiding in the bathroom for an hour after
the shooting had stopped. 189 In fact, given the traumatic
quality of the events described by the applicant, it was quite
plausible for him to remain hiding for an hour or even longer.
Second, the deck is stacked against survivors because key
traits of the adjudication process greatly increase the chances
a survivor will tell inconsistent versions of her story. An
early version will be frozen in writing, while the final version
(her testimony) will be told in a starkly intimidating setting,
where the applicant will be subjected to adversarial (and
often aggressive) cross-examination. For survivors, simply
telling the story is emotionally challenging. The experience of
testifying in court can provoke intrusive symptoms, and a
survivor’s first concern (if only subconsciously) will be to
“manage” her testimony in a way that minimizes trauma
symptoms, even if the result is inconsistent with earlier
statements. 190 And because government lawyers rarely have
evidence of their own, their primary strategy will be to
challenge the applicant’s credibility and highlight
discrepancies— or even induce them.
In this context, the distinction between story and
discourse again becomes useful. Most factors used to assess
credibility, including demeanor and things like “vague” or
“evasive” answers, relate to the discourse of the applicant’s
narrative. They are deemed relevant to credibility, but they
have no real bearing on whether the story is true—on
whether it accurately conveys what happened.
But
189. Sanga v. Gonzalez, 121 Fed. App’x 841, 843 (10th Cir. 2005).
190. See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180 (“In order to resolve her own doubts
or conflicting feelings, the patent may sometimes try to reach premature closure
on the facts of the story”); Almog, supra note 119, at 298–301 (discussing the
tension between the demands made on narrative in the context of therapy and
of law).
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inconsistencies regarding the number of times an applicant
was raped or the details of other central events are aspects of
story rather than discourse. There is a widespread belief that
symptoms of trauma effect discourse but not story; that they
have an impact on how a story is told, but not on details of
the story itself. But empirical research has proven that
premise to be false: when a witness is a trauma survivor,
inconsistencies in the witness’s story cannot be taken as
evidence that the witness is not credible.
And yet, in the context of asylum adjudication,
immigration judges continue to rely on lay assumptions
rather than proven empirical knowledge when they make
credibility findings. The First Circuit’s decision in Zeru v.
Gonzales 191 provides a striking example of both judicial
chutzpah with regard to expert evidence on trauma and the
egregious delays sometimes produced by the U.S.
government’s byzantine system for adjudicating asylum
claims.
Zeru filed an affirmative application for asylum in 1995;
after an interview, an asylum officer initiated removal
proceedings, and she renewed her application in immigration
court.
An immigration judge heard testimony on five
occasions between January 1999 and March 2002. 192 Her
case was then transferred to a new judge, who held an
additional full day of hearings before denying her application
in December 2003. 193 In 2006, the Board of Immigration
Appeals rejected Zeru’s direct appeal and a subsequent
motion to reopen. 194 And in 2007—twelve years after her
application was first filed—the First Circuit affirmed the
second judge’s conclusion that Zeru was not credible, as well
as the decisions to deny both her asylum claim and her
motion to reopen. 195
Zeru testified she had been arrested and raped by
Eritrean officials, and the judge’s negative credibility finding
was based largely on Zeru’s inconsistent statements
regarding the number of times she was raped. During 1998
interviews with Dr. Melissa Wattenburg, a clinical
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2007) .
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 67–68.
See id. at 69–72.
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psychologist who specialized in PTSD, Zeru said she was
raped three times.
An assessment by Dr. Wattenberg
concluded that Zeru “meets criterion for current moderate
During direct
PTSD, and moderate depression.” 196
examination at the 2003 hearing, however, Zeru testified that
she was raped only once, at the start of her imprisonment.
On cross-examination, she testified that she had also been
Her
raped a second time, just before her release. 197
statements were also inconsistent in other respects. For
instance, in 1999, she testified that Eritrean security officers
interrogated her for ten hours, and the encounter “terrified”
her. In 2003, she “described the episode as a four-hour
interrogation, and stated that she did not take the officers’
warnings seriously.” 198
During the immigration court hearing and her direct
appeal to the BIA, Zeru presented evidence that she suffered
from PTSD, but her attorney did not assert the discrepancies
in her story were caused by trauma. 199 Her motion to reopen,
however, was filed by a different lawyer and was replete with
evidence to support that conclusion. In support of her motion,
Zeru submitted evidence that her PTSD had worsened in
advance of her impending deportation, including a letter from
a psychiatrist who treated her after she was admitted to a
hospital for “depression and suicidal thoughts.” 200 Three
additional letters accompanied the motion.
In one, a
psychiatrist explained that Zeru had flashbacks to her rapes
and imprisonments, and used dissociation and denial to avoid
re-experiencing trauma. In a second, a psychologist who met

196. Id. at 64.
197. Zeru, 503 F.3d at 64.
198. Id. at 70. Zeru also gave inconsistent testimony on several points that
were irrelevant to her asylum claim, including the place where she first met a
witness, the number of grades she completed in school, and the length of time
she had owned a business in Eritrea. See id. At the time of the hearing, some
federal circuits would have barred the judge from considering such matters as
part of a credibility finding. See, e.g., Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064
(9th Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled in our circuit that minor inconsistencies that
do not go to the heart of an applicant’s claim for asylum cannot support an
adverse credibility determination.”). Following enactment of the REAL ID Act,
however, a judge is authorized to consider any inconsistency, no matter how
remote it may be to an applicant’s claim. [FN, SUGGEST: See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2012).]
199. See Zeru, 503 F.3d at 73–74.
200. Id. at 67.
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with Zeru in 2006 wrote that she was “too tearful and
distressed” to discuss the details of her rapes. 201 A third
letter, written by a forensic psychologist, provided an
extensive literature review regarding the symptoms of
trauma. 202 Despite that evidence, the BIA denied Zeru’s
motion.
The immigration judge’s negative credibility finding
made it clear that the judge relied on ill-informed lay
assumptions regarding the symptoms of trauma. Without
supporting evidence, the judge opined that “it would not be
unusual for a victim of trauma to confuse dates or sequences
of events, but it would be very unusual . . . to simply forget
that an event occurred.” 203 The word “forget” is deeply
problematic here, and a reasonable judge familiar with the
research on trauma would not make such a claim. There are
other reasons why a rape survivor might give differing
accounts of the number of times she was raped, ranging from
her psychological state at the time of her statements to a
perceived need to “embellish” the severity of the trauma she
suffered for certain audiences—as if being raped once isn’t
enough. Given that Zeru undisputedly suffered from trauma,
the fact that she gave inconsistent statements concerning the
number times she was raped cannot be taken as evidence that
she was not raped at all.
Nonetheless, the First Circuit affirmed both the negative
credibility finding and the judge’s decision to deny asylum. In
doing so, the court emphasized that an immigration judge’s
credibility findings “demand deference” 204 and should not be
reversed unless “any reasonable adjudicator” would be
compelled to disagree. 205 Because the immigration judge did
not ignore Dr. Wattenberg’s conclusion that Zeru was
suffering from PTSD, the First Circuit held the judge did not
err. 206 The court also affirmed the BIA’s decision to deny
Zeru’s motion to reopen, largely on the grounds that Zeru
201. Id. at 68.
202. Id. at 67–68.
203. Id. at 65.
204. Id. at 69–70.
205. See Zeru, 503 F.3d. at 71 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012)).
206. See id. at 71. It should be noted that the court first held that Zeru had
waived these issues by failing to raise them on direct appeal to the BIA. The
court then addressed them anyway, and concluded that it would have affirmed
the negative credibility findings even if Zeru had raised the issue below. See id.
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failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel or offer
material evidence that was previously unavailable. 207
The First Circuit’s decision reflects a common belief that
expert evidence related to credibility is both irrelevant and
prejudicial. Both state and federal courts have held that a
party may not use expert testimony to argue that inconsistent
statements resulted from symptoms of PTSD. For instance,
in Westcott v. Crinklaw, a civil rights case, the Eight Circuit
held that “ ‘[a]n expert may not go so far as to usurp the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and
determine credibility.’ “ 208 The court reached that conclusion
even though the expert did not directly testify that the
witness’s inconsistent statements were, in fact, caused by
PTSD. Rather, the expert simply testified that the witness
was suffering from PTSD, and that PTSD “may cause a
person to make inaccurate, unreliable and incomplete
statements.” 209 In other words, the appeals court wrongly
assumed that an untrained layperson is capable of accurately
assessing the credibility of a witness under any and all
circumstances, even when the witness is suffering from
PTSD.
B. The Impact of a Written Declaration
The discrepancies in Zeru were limited to the applicant’s
oral statements. But in asylum cases, the routine practice of
filing a declaration drafted by a lawyer or community group
adds a further layer of complexity. If the person who drafts
the declaration is not well-informed about the effects of
trauma and the most effective practices for working with
survivors, that person may unwittingly increase the
likelihood that the applicant is deemed not credible.
To understand how a lawyer or community
representative may make matters worse, it is useful to
compare the procedures for testimonial therapy with the way
most lawyers typically work with their clients. In both
situations, the applicant will be asked to tell her story, and a

207. See id. at 71–72.
208. Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 829 (1981)).
209. Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).
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version of her story will be reduced to writing.
The
differences, however, are stark.
During testimonial therapy, the therapist will typically
meet with a client six to twelve times, for as much as ninety
minutes at a time, over a period of many weeks. 210 During
those sessions, the therapist will begin with a detailed
account of the client’s life before the trauma, thereby putting
the traumatic events in a larger context, and integrating
those events into the applicant’s full life story. While
discussing the traumatic events, the therapist will carefully
probe for additional details, while being sensitive to the
client’s emotional state. If necessary, the therapist will back
away from difficult moments, then probe for details again
when the client is better able to provide them.
All of this requires a level of attention, care, and training
that immigration lawyers can rarely bring to their meetings
with clients. Private lawyers must bill for time spent with a
client, and even lawyers who work for non-profit agencies
have limited time for client interviews. Very few lawyers will
be willing or able to spend sufficient time interviewing a
client who has experienced trauma.
Moreover, many lawyers may feel uncomfortable with the
emotions that can surface while interviewing a trauma
survivor, and thus they may back away from—and never fully
probe—the most traumatic aspects of a client’s story. As a
result, the written declaration may be based on an incomplete
version of the story, one that omits critical events or other
important details. As Herman notes, during therapy a
survivor “may insist that the therapist validate a partial and
incomplete
version
of
events
without
further
exploration . . . .” 211 The same thing may happen during
meetings with a lawyer—indeed, it seems more likely to
happen. If it does, the odds that an applicant’s testimony will
differ from her declaration are high. In the British study of
refugees who suffered from PTSD, when refugees were asked
to describe a traumatic event twice, the discrepancy rate for
even central details was roughly 30%, and it increased as

210. See, e.g., Weine, et al., supra note 170, at 1721 (six sessions of ninety
minutes each); Van Dijk et al., supra note 171, at 363 (twelve sessions); Agger,
et al., supra note 172, at 211 (four sessions of 90–120 minutes each).
211. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180.
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more time passed between the first and second interview. 212
The drafting of the declaration itself introduces further
complications. When a survivor talks about the trauma she
experienced, her statements are likely to be both logically and
chronologically fragmented as well as incomplete.
The
applicant’s lawyer or representative will then try to fashion
those statements into a coherent and chronological account of
the events. The danger in doing so is that the story as told by
the lawyer may differ in important ways from the applicant’s
testimony at trial, and a judge may believe those differences
to be evidence of untruthfulness. Once again, narrative
theory is a useful tool for understanding the nature of the
challenge.
When an applicant testifies at a hearing, both the story
and the discourse are the work of the applicant. A lawyer can
shape the testimony through her questions, but in the end the
applicant will not only supply the characters and events, but
will also determine how the story is told. The process of
drafting a written declaration is quite different: while the
applicant still supplies the story, the discourse is almost
entirely the work of the person who drafts the declaration.
That person, and not the applicant, will decided how much
detail to include, whether certain things should be omitted
entirely, what words should be used, and in what order the
events will be presented.
Both before and during trial, a trauma survivor may have
difficulty telling a coherent, well-ordered, chronological story.
Instead, her testimony may be fragmented, disjointed, and
out of sequence, and she may omit important details in an
effort to manage the symptoms of trauma and avoid intrusive
flashbacks.
And yet when drafting the declaration, a
competent, well-meaning lawyer or representative may
reshape an applicant’s story with the aim of telling the story
in a way that conforms to a judge’s expectations. In doing so,
the drafter may literally create a declaration that goes beyond
an applicant’s ability to testify, and thereby increase the
chances that an immigration judge will find an applicant’s
testimony to be inconsistent with her declaration.
The challenges faced by the applicant are further
212. See Herlihy & Turner, supra note 158, at 88–89. Because the data are
presented as a graph rather than a table, a more precise figure is not available.
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compounded by the context in which the hearing takes place.
The immigration courts face an enormous, multi-year
backlog, and the typical judge completes 144 asylum claims
each year in the course of completing nearly 1,000 removal
cases—an average of roughly nineteen or twenty completed
cases a week. 213 Professor Stacy Caplow has succinctly
explained the practical consequences of this caseload:
Most [judges] are intelligent, patient, and respectful under
quite stressful conditions. They listen to people tell tales
of difficult lives, sacrifices, fears, and hopes, hour after
hour, day after day. This repetition and volume has an
inevitable, inuring effect on their attitudes. While they
must be objective, they also are listening carefully for
inconsistencies, mistakes, or inaccuracies, in other words,
a reason to deny relief. 214

Caplow also notes that judges “sometimes even seem to
be trying to trap or trip up the applicant, or they may be
aggressive in their questioning and probing.” 215 The truth of
that point is even greater for government lawyers, whose
cross-examination of asylum applicants is often aggressive
and ultimately intended to “trip up” the applicant by
highlighting—or even inducing—inconsistencies in the
applicant’s story. 216
The combative, free-swinging style of many government
lawyers was evident in a research study in which trained
observers watched and reported on immigration court
hearings. 217 Though some government lawyers conducted
cross-examination in a way that was “professional, respectful,
213. The average number of cases per judge is not published and must be
calculated from other data. On June 15, 2015, the website of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review listed 253 immigration judges nationwide. See
EOIR Immigration Court listing, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last visited June 15,
2015). Collectively, those judges completed 248,078 cases in fiscal year 2014, of
which 36,614 were asylum cases. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at A2,
K4. Thus, the average immigration judge completed 981 cases during that year,
of which 144 were asylum cases. It should be noted that not every completed
asylum case requires a full hearing: some 7,306 asylum claims were
“withdrawn” or “abandoned.” See id. at K4.
214. Caplow, supra note 6, at 263.
215. Caplow, supra note 6, at 263.
216. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United
States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured
Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 493 (1992/93).
217. See id. at 433.
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and efficient,” others engaged in lengthy, aggressive crossexaminations that often focused more on the respondent’s
character than the merits of the case. Observers noted that
the manner of these attorneys was often “hostile, sarcastic, or
disbelieving.” 218 At times, government lawyers attempted to
block applicants from explaining their answers, and their
tactics seemed to have no purpose other than portraying the
applicant as “evasive.” 219
In the face of such tactics, it is hardly surprising that a
trauma survivor might give testimony inconsistent with the
story she told many months earlier in the relative safety of
meetings with a lawyer or representative. As the research on
asylum cases demonstrates, the most common form of
inconsistency—one relied on by judges in 57% of cases—is an
inconsistency between the applicant’s testimony and the
written declaration. Thus, the process by which a declaration
is drafted is critical, and this Article now turns to that topic,
with a detailed account from one asylum clinic as an
exemplary example of how that work might be done most
effectively.
C. The Challenges of Drafting An Effective Declaration
An asylum declaration is simply a detailed account of the
applicant’s story, a written statement of the facts underlying
her claim. There are books and articles advising what a
lawyer should do when drafting one, almost all of which focus
on the end product; on the final document itself and not the
often “messy” process by which a declaration is drafted. 220
But Professor Stacy Caplow, director of the asylum clinic at
Brooklyn Law School, has written a superb account of the
process her students follow. 221 The work of those students is
exemplary, and a review of Caplow’s account underscores the
ways in which a lawyer can unwittingly impede (or even
torpedo) a trauma survivor’s chances for success, by
“overwriting” the declaration, failing to probe for difficult
details, or failing to spend sufficient time with an applicant to
218. Id. at 493.
219. Id. at 493.
220. See, e.g., REGINA GERMAN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 353 (Am.
Immigration Lawyer’s Assoc. 4th ed. 2005); ROBERT JOBE, ET AL., WINNING
ASYLUM CASES §§ 13–19 (Immigrant Legal Resource Center 2004).
221. See Caplow, supra note 6.
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fully develop the applicant’s story.
For Caplow and her students, the declaration is the
“central evidence” in the case, and the factfinder’s “first
exposure to the heart of the claim.” 222 The declaration
“previews the facts, establishes the case theory, introduces
the client, and sets the stage” for the hearing. 223 The ultimate
goal, as Caplow describes it, is to “translate facts” into a
“riveting narrative”—“a story that compels the desired
result.” 224 Students are taught to strive for a “comprehensive,
creative, and painstakingly detailed document that delicately
balances case theory and the client’s voice but also tells a
story of courage, suffering, loss, sacrifice, and exile.” 225 And
in doing so, they seek to “empower” the applicant to testify
“confidently and believably” during a later interview or
hearing. 226
The underlying facts—the characters and events that
form the story—must be elicited from the client, and Caplow
describes the process of doing so as “messy, arduous, and
lengthy.” 227 Students conduct multiple interviews over a
period of weeks or months, in which they typically follow a
“rough chronology” of the client’s life, from background
information through the central facts underlying the claim
and the client’s ultimate flight from her country of nationality
to the United States. 228 Students ask open-ended questions,
and many clients first tell their story in a “burst of
information” in which they “gallop through years of
troubles.” 229 In doing so, clients tend to “omit details, go off
on tangents, and drift between time frames.” 230 In Caplow’s
words, the “process usually resembles a looping
conversation,” a process of moving forward then circling back
to verify, elaborate, and explain. 231 The process requires
persistence, and a willingness to push the client. As one client
told Caplow’s students: “You are asking me about things I
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Caplow, supra note 6, at 249.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 249.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 252, 258.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 256–57.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 257.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 257.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 272.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 266.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 266.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 272–73.
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have been trying to forget.” 232
For Caplow’s students, the work is ultimately a process of
“trust-building between lawyer and client that slowly yields
more nuanced and specific information.”
And—just as
critically—it is a process of “case-building during which the
client’s memory, confidence, and eloquence improve and grow
so that by the time the hearing occurs, he or she truly
understands” what must be articulated and explained. 233 It is
also a “cycle of rehearsals,” in which the applicant “is
transformed into a more comfortable storyteller before an
audience other than sympathetic law students.” 234
This Article quotes Caplow at length for two distinct
reasons. First, the exemplary process she describes is one
that rarely happens outside the setting of a law school asylum
clinic. Lawyers in private practice must charge for their time,
and even lawyers who work for a non-profit agency are
constrained by budgets and caseloads. As a result, outside
the context of an asylum clinic, few if any immigration
lawyers are able to give an asylum applicant the time and
attention the applicant would receive from Caplow’s students.
The same is undoubtedly true for the community groups that
assist unrepresented applicants. And yet, if the client is a
trauma survivor, a lawyer or representative who does
anything less than Caplow’s students is unlikely to elicit the
full details of the survivor’s story, and thus the applicant is
more likely to face a negative credibility finding and the
denial of asylum.
Beyond that truth, the work of Caplow’s students is
remarkable because it very closely resembles the process of
testimonial therapy. The similarities are striking: among
other things, students meet with their client multiple times
over a period of weeks or months; they work to build trust;
and they put the core of the applicant’s claim into the broader
context of the client’s life. 235 They also probe for details and
fill in gaps until they obtain a complete account of the client’s
story. And the end “product” of that process—just as in
testimonial therapy—is a thorough written account of the
232. Caplow, supra note 6, at 266.
233. Caplow, supra note 6, at 265.
234. Caplow, supra note 6, at 265.
235. See supra, text accompanying notes 161 to 178 for a detailed discussion
of testimonial therapy.
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client’s story, one signed by the client and shared with others.
Caplow’s students are not therapists, but it is not an
exaggeration to suggest that their work with a client may be
no less therapeutic than the work performed by a trained
counselor during testimonial therapy. This observation is
consistent with the experience of mental health professionals
who work with torture survivors. In an article on the
therapeutic effects of evaluating asylum seekers, two such
professionals emphasize that “the process of organizing the
torture story into a coherent narrative” has specific
therapeutic benefits that will help a survivor gain asylum. 236
In their words, “[t]he [evaluation] process can empower the
survivor to testify in court and to cope with the anxiety and
stress of the asylum process.” 237 And because all of this
happens before the client’s story is committed to writing and
filed with the asylum office or the court, the chances that the
client’s testimony will be inconsistent with the declaration
are greatly reduced.
But the process of eliciting facts from an applicant is
simply the background for drafting an affidavit: in the
language of narrative theory, the process is focused on the
story. The drafter must then craft the discourse, must still
shape the raw material of the story into a narrative text. And
it is here, too, that Caplow’s clinical students excel in ways
that may not be common among practicing immigration
lawyers.
At various points, Caplow describes the ideal declaration
as one that is “consistent,” “detailed,” plausible,” and
“coherent” 238—precisely the same adjectives immigration
judges often use when they speak of the testimony needed to
establish an applicant’s claim without the benefit of
corroborating evidence. 239 Caplow’s students are encouraged
“to give texture and vitality to their client’s voice,” but they
are also cautioned about the dangers of going too far. Many
236. Gangsei & Deutsch, supra note 20, at 83–84.
237. Gangsei & Deutsch, supra note 20, at 84.
238. See Caplow, supra note 6, at 252 (“The facts need to be detailed,
plausible, and consistent . . . .”), 265 (an attorney should prepare a “coherent
and moving client narrative”).
239. In reviewing the decisions of immigration judges, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has long used these words. See, e.g., In re S–M–J–, 21
I&N Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997); Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124 (BIA
1989); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987).
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applicants tell their stories in language that is “colorless and
repetitious,” and it can be tempting for a lawyer to “embellish
and overstate facts”—for instance, by substituting “torture”
when the client said “hurt.” 240 Students are taught that
“[a]uthenticity is critical,” and that “[l]anguage, phrasing, and
imagery unsuitable to the education, articulation and
imagination of the client might have a devastating impact” on
the client’s credibility by creating the impression that the
declaration was “the product of lawyer manipulation.” 241 And
while Caplow’s students are taught to draft a detailed
declaration, 242 they are also cautioned about the potential
dangers of too much detail. As Caplow notes, “[t]here is a
concern that the [declaration] not be so detailed as to risk
possible inconsistencies when the affiant relates the facts
under the pressure of oral testimony.” 243
Obviously, an immigration judge must still point to
specific inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and
declaration to support a negative credibility finding.
Nonetheless, a lawyer who is less cautious than Caplow’s
students and not attuned to the challenges faced by trauma
survivors can easily draft a declaration that is too detailed,
and too much in the voice of a lawyer—so much so that the
declaration goes beyond the client’s ability to testify. And as
Caplow recognizes, a lawyer who does so may create the
impression that the testimony and declaration are
inconsistent, and thereby increase the likelihood that a judge
will find the applicant not credible.
V. STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
In recent decades, federal courts, legal scholars, and
immigration advocates have harshly criticized the asylum
adjudication process and the immigration court system more
broadly. The Seventh Circuit has been a particularly harsh
critic. In Niam v. Ashcroft, for instance, one panel declared
“the elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of
logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board [of

240.
241.
242.
243.

Caplow, supra note 6, at 283.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 283–84.
See Caplow, supra note 6, at 280–81.
Caplow, supra note 6, at 257 n.32.
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Immigration Appeals] in this as in other cases.” 244 This
chorus of criticism has been accompanied by numerous
proposals for reform. Some are far-reaching while others are
modest; but with one notable exception, none would
effectively address the challenges faced by trauma survivors
who seek asylum.
A. The Scope of Reform Proposals
The most comprehensive proposal follows from an
exhaustive study of asylum cases published in 2007 under the
title Refugee Roulette. In that study, the authors found
widespread and troubling inconsistencies in the percentage of
applications granted or denied by individual immigration
judges, even when judges heard cases in the same city with
applicants from the same countries. 245 For instance, two
immigration judges in Miami granted asylum to 5% and 6% of
applicants from Colombia, while two different judges in
Miami granted asylum in 77% and 88% of such cases. 246 The
study also found widespread inconsistencies among decisions
by individual asylum officers, and in the results of appeals to
both the BIA and the federal circuit courts. 247
Eight years have passed since Refugee Roulette was
published, but recent immigration court statistics suggest
widespread problems persist.
In fiscal year 2014,
immigration court judges granted 49% of the 17,997 asylum
claims that received a full adjudication. 248 However, the
grant rate varied sharply depending on a claim’s procedural
posture: judges granted 75% of affirmative claims, compared
to just 28% of defensive claims. 249 In other words, claims
previously adjudicated (but not granted) by an asylum officer
were nearly three times more likely to be granted by an
immigration judge than claims first filed with the

244. Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
245. See generally Refugee Roulette, supra note 43.
246. Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 338. The mean grant rate for
Colombian cases among Miami’s 22 judges was 30%. See id. Notably, each judge
in Miami heard at least 162 Columbian cases during the period under study
(most heard more than 300), and cases were assigned to judges randomly. See
id.
247. See Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 372-74.
248. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2.
249. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3.
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immigration court. 250
The disparities between courts in different cities were
equally stark. In El Paso, Texas, judges adjudicated 120
claims and granted none. In Atlanta, judges granted two
claims out of 137. Grant rates were also low in Cleveland
(18%); Detroit (14%); Las Vegas (7%); and New Orleans
(16%). 251 At the opposite end of the spectrum, judges in New
York City granted 84% of the claims they adjudicated. 252 The
grant rate was also higher than average in Arlington,
Virginia (71%); Honolulu (74%); Philadelphia (59%); and San
Francisco (59%). 253
The source for these figures—EOIR’s Statistical
Yearbook—does not break down the grant rates by the
applicant’s country of origin within each court. Thus, direct
comparisons to the discrepancies found by the authors of
Refugee Roulette are not possible without more data.
Nonetheless, the EOIR data compel the conclusion that
troubling disparities remain.
Despite these disparities, the authors of Refugee Roulette
do not question the wisdom of adjudicating asylum cases in
an adversarial hearing, nor do they recommend streamlining
the existing two-track system of asylum interviews and
250. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K3. This gap has grown wider
in recent years: between fiscal years 2010 and 2014, the grant rate for
affirmative claims climbed steadily from 61% to 75%, while the grant rate for
defensive claims declined from 34% to 28%. See id. But the disparity between
affirmative and defensive claims is more stark than these numbers suggest: in
2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the affirmative claims they adjudicated,
while referring roughly 50% to the immigration courts. See supra, note 63.
Because cases referred by the asylum office in one year may not be completed by
an immigration court until the following year (or several years later), and some
affirmative claims received by the immigration courts are not adjudicated, it is
not possible to calculate a precise overall grant rate for affirmative claims.
Nonetheless, for affirmative claims that are fully adjudicated, the grant number
is certainly more than 80% and probably near 90%.
251. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2. Grant rates were also low
at various immigration detention centers, see id., but because the demographics
of persons held in those centers differ from the demographics of other courts,
they are not included here. In particular, many cases adjudicated at detention
centers involve persons who are barred from asylum because they have been
convicted of any aggravated felony.
252. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2. The disparity between New
York City and the rest of the nation is striking. Judges there adjudicated 5,750
claims, which amounts to 32% of all claims adjudicated nationwide. And yet
those judges granted 55% of all claims granted nationwide. See id.
253. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at K2.
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immigration court hearings. Instead, the Refugee Roulette
authors recommend comprehensive and hugely expensive
reforms to the immigration court system, including a
substantial increase in the resources available to immigration
courts (more judges and clerks, better interpretation) as well
as court-appointed and publicly-funded lawyers for indigent
applicants. 254 They also recommend that immigration courts
should “be insulated from politics” by making them
independent from the Department of Justice, 255 that hiring
standards for judges should be “more rigorous,” 256 and that
asylum officers and judges should receive better training. 257
With the exception of improved training, none of these
changes would directly impact the concerns detailed in this
Article. That aside, the recommendations of these scholars
are impractical: given the federal government’s finances and
the position of many conservative lawmakers on immigration
reform, their plea for a huge increase in resources is
politically unviable, both now and in the foreseeable future.
Other scholars, most notably Professor Stephen
Legomsky, have called for a broad restructuring of the
process by which immigration cases are adjudicated. 258
Professor Legomsky’s plan would attempt to insulate the
immigration courts from political and budgetary pressures by
converting immigration judges to administrative law judges
housed in an independent executive branch tribunal, and
would also establish an Article III immigration appellate
court. 259 On the other hand, both the National Association of
Immigration Judges and the ABA propose to convert the
immigration court system into an Article I court. 260
Meanwhile, Bruce Einhorn, a former immigration judge, has
called for the creation of a new “U.S. Asylum Court” whose

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 383–84.
Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 387.
Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 380.
Refugee Roulette, supra note 43, at 381.
Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59
DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010).
259. Id. at 1686.
260. See Executive Office for Immigration Review: Oversight Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10 (2010) (statement of Hon.
Dana Leigh Marks, President, National Association of Immigration Judges);
ABA Comm’n On Immigr., Reforming The Immigration System § 6–35 (2010).
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judges would consider only claims for asylum. 261
Still other critics have proposed modest reforms aimed
directly at credibility. For instance, Professor Ilene Durst
recommends that applicants should be given “the benefit of
the doubt,” and that courts should adopt a “presumption of
credibility” that could be rebutted only by “clear and
convincing evidence of material misrepresentations or other
material distortions.” 262 Professor Michael Kagan rejects that
approach and proposes instead that courts should adopt a
standard used by the UNHCR, one that relies on whether a
claim is “coherent and plausible,” does not contradict
“generally known facts,” and is “on balance, capable of being
Under that standard, an applicant would
believed.” 263
ultimately be found credible if there is any “reasonable basis”
for believing the applicant’s claim. 264
But none of these proposals gets to the heart of the
problem presented here: a decision-maker cannot assume an
applicant suffering from trauma will tell their story
consistently, even with regard to critical details, and
especially not when subjected to adversarial crossRemarkably, virtually all commentators
examination. 265

261. Einhorn, supra note 21, at 161.
262. Ilene Durst, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference
to the Refugee’s Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 127, 127–28, 131 (2000). Durst
fails to explain precisely what she means by “material misrepresentations or
other material distortions,” or how a court would decide whether that standard
has been met. A student note likewise recommends a presumption of
credibility, but only for women who claim to have been raped or sexually
assaulted. Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s
Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673
(2007).
263. Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective
Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEORGETOWN IMM.
L. J. 367, 381–82 (2003).
264. Id. at 403. Arguably, this “reasonable basis” approach is simply a
presumption of credibility cloaked in a different name.
265. One student note does recommend replacing the existing system with
various procedures borrowed from alternative dispute resolution, including
early neutral evaluation before a non-adversarial hearing as well as mandatory
mediation in any case appealed to the federal courts. Daniel Forman, Note,
Improving Asylum Seeker Credibility Determinations: Introducing Appropriate
Dispute Resolution Techniques into the Process, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
207, 232–39 (2008). However, the proposed process would include multiple
interviews with the applicant, and the final decision-maker would have access
to a written record of the applicant’s prior statements to help assess the
applicant’s credibility. Id. at 235–36.
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seem to accept that an adversarial hearing is a fair, accurate,
and efficient way to adjudicate asylum claims—even though
some countries (Australia and Canada, for instance) use a
process that is at least partially non-adversarial, 266 and the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees officially takes no
position on which approach is preferable. 267
One scholar—Professor Won Kidane—has argued directly
and in detail that the United States should adopt a nonadversarial adjudication system for all immigration cases,
including asylum claims. 268 In doing so, he divides the
advantages of a non-adversarial system into four categories.
First, Professor Kidane emphasizes that the current
system is enormously wasteful.
For each full-time
immigration judge, there are four full-time lawyers who
represent the Government in cases heard by that judge,
including appeals. 269 Professor Kidane surmises that these
lawyers add little to the accuracy of adjudications, at least in
asylum cases. In most such cases, the role of government
lawyers is limited to the adversarial cross-examination of the
applicant and delivery of a short closing statement. 270
Second, Professor Kidane emphasizes that the accuracy
of immigration decision-making would be improved if money
now spent on Government lawyers were spent instead on
adding more judges. Beyond the obvious fact that judges
would have more time to consider each case, Professor Kidane
emphasizes that judges would be free to make decisions
without the burden of Government lawyers who, in his words,

266. The procedures followed in other countries are too complex to merit
discussion here, but Prof. Peter Billings has analyzed the systems of four
common law countries in detail, and he ultimately concludes that the goals of
asylum adjudication would best be served by “a broadly inquisitorial [i.e., nonadversarial] approach” at the trial level. Peter W. Billings, A Comparative
Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative Systems for Determining Asylum
Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 273–80, 296-97 (2000).
267. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and
Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ¶ 189 et
seq. (reissued Dec. 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (hereinafter “U.N. Refugee Handbook”).
268. Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45
AKRON L. REV. 647 (2012).
269. Id. at 709 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635, 1701 (2010).
270. See Anker, supra note 216, at 489–95.
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do little more than “spray pepper” in the eyes of the judges. 271
Professor Kidane’s third point centers on fairness. Citing
Refugee Roulette and other sources, he contends that the
“overwhelming majority” of respondents in removal
proceedings are unrepresented. 272 In fact, EOIR statistics
show that the percentage of unrepresented respondents has
fallen over the past four years, from 60% in 2010 to 45% in
2014. 273 Nonetheless, Professor Kidane’s point is important:
an adversarial hearing is “fair” only when both sides have a
comparable arsenal of legal “weapons.” But in immigration
court, the table is tilted very heavily in the Government’s
favor. The problem is compounded by the awkward position
of immigration judges, who frequently cross-examine
witnesses themselves. 274 Thus, an unrepresented applicant
may feel he or she is confronted by two government
lawyers. 275 Professor Kidane’s final point in favor of a nonadversarial model is simply that a fair, efficient, and less
expensive system would be more acceptable politically. 276
Professor Kidane’s points apply with great force to the
adjudication of asylum claims filed by trauma survivors. For
the reasons discussed earlier, a system that relies on the
adversarial cross-examination of trauma survivors is destined
to be both grossly inaccurate and fundamentally unfair. As a
study conducted by Deborah Anker emphasized, the crossexamination of asylum applicants by Government lawyers
tends to focus on credibility and character rather than
substance.
Observers noted that the manner of trial
attorneys was often “hostile, sarcastic, and disbelieving,” and

271. Kidane, supra note 268, at 710–11. After working for three years as an
INS trial attorney, I can attest to the fact that Prof. Kidane has accurately
described the way many of my former colleagues approached their work.
272. Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15.
273. EOIR 2014 Yearbook, supra note 71, at F1.
274. Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15 (citing Deborah E. Anker,
Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 489–90 (1992)). After observing nearly
200 deportation cases, Prof. Anker concluded that judges often did not appear to
be neutral. In her words: “Instead of an independent adjudicator and an
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two,
instead of one, opposing counsels.” Anker at 489.
275. Kidane, supra note 268, at 714–15.
276. Kidane, supra note 268, at 716. The truth of that claim, of course,
assumes the political beliefs of most citizens and politicians are rational.
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they concluded that the often-extensive cross-examination
added very little to the effective resolution of a case. 277 In
such circumstances, it is not an exaggeration to say that
government trial lawyers rarely do more than “throw pepper”
in the judge’s eyes. Paying them to do so at taxpayer expense
is inordinately wasteful and inefficient. Still, it is difficult to
imagine Congressional support for an entirely nonadversarial immigration system, especially when, as in recent
years, the Government’s focus has been on the deportation of
non-citizens who have a criminal conviction, however
minor. 278
B. The Non-Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for
Asylum
If the United States is genuinely committed to the fair,
accurate, and efficient adjudication of claims for asylum, the
existing adversarial system should be abandoned. And in the
absence of a fully inquisitorial immigration court, the only
way to accomplish that result would be to remove the
adjudication of asylum claims entirely from the existing
immigration court system.
Thus, the existing two-tiered system of informal
interviews with asylum officers and adversarial hearings in
immigration court should be replaced with a single
adjudication, one that is relatively formal, non-adversarial,
and separate from the immigration courts. In contrast to
immigration court hearings, the hearing officer should
conduct the questioning instead of a government lawyer. In
the great majority of cases, the government should not (and
need not) be represented, and prior versions of the applicant’s
story should not be considered. Exceptions to these last two
points could be made in compelling circumstances: for
instance, if there are serious reasons to believe the applicant
assisted in the persecution of others or was involved in
terrorism or other serious criminal activity. Within this
framework, further details should be left to discussions

277. Anker, supra note 216, at 49–95.
278. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Report Finds Deportations Focus on Criminal
Records, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 29, 2014), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/report-finds-deportations-focus-on-criminalrecords.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
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between government officials, immigration advocates, and
experts on psychological trauma.
There are two ways by which a non-adversarial system
could be implemented. The easier approach would be to
expand the existing network of asylum offices, and to
adjudicate all claims for asylum there. For applicants who
file an asylum claim after a removal case has begun, removal
proceedings could be continued pending a separate
assessment of their eligibility for asylum, 279 and the removal
case could then be terminated if asylum is granted. Certain
changes to the asylum offices would be needed. Officers and
staff should be added, professional interpreters should be
hired, and a formal record (including a transcript) should be
created. But all of these changes could almost certainly be
made through executive action, without the involvement of
Congress.
The potential downside of that approach, as Professor
Legomsky suggests, is that any adjudication conducted within
existing federal agencies may be subject to both budgetary
and political pressures. 280 The alternative, then, would be to
create an entirely new administrative tribunal, one
independent from both the Justice Department and the
Department of Homeland Security. In that scenario, the
existing asylum offices would be eliminated, and personnel
could be shifted to the new tribunal. In contrast to the first
approach, however, an independent tribunal could be created
only through an act of Congress.
Any move to a purely non-adversarial system for
adjudicating asylum claims need not be prohibitively
expensive. The workload of the immigration courts would be
diminished by more than half, 281 and new positions could be

279. An immigration judge has discretion to postpone removal proceedings
for good cause on the motion of either party. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6.
280. Prof. Legomsky makes the same point at length when he argues for a
new immigration tribunal outside the Department of Justice. See Legomsky,
supra note 258, at 1665–1671.
281. The remaining system would still decide, among other things, whether
aliens are subject to removal from the United States, and whether they are
eligible for other forms of relief from removal such as adjustment of status,
cancellation of removal, or the relief provided under INA section 212(c) to
certain immigrants convicted of a crime. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (authorizing the
cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) &
(h) (authorizing the discretionary waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility
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filled by drawing qualified personnel from the ranks of
immigration judges and the corps of lawyers who now
represent the government in immigration court. And if the
Board of Immigration Appeals were eliminated—as Professor
Legomsky recommends—personnel could also be drawn from
the ranks of government lawyers who now work for the BIA.
In either scenario, the end result would be an
adjudication system that is more efficient, better staffed,
more consistent with U.N. recommendations and the refugee
adjudication practices in other countries, and more responsive
to both the spirit of refugee law and the challenges faced by
trauma survivors who seek asylum.
C. Other Trauma-Related Reforms
Implementing the proposed reforms will require time,
money, and substantial political will. In the long run, it may
never happen. In the short run, important changes could
easily be made to the existing adjudication process. Most
notably, key participants in process should be thoroughly
trained in the nature and symptoms of trauma, and the
effects of trauma on the ways in which survivors tell their
stories. In addition, the claims of trauma survivors could be
adjudicated more fairly if small changes were made to
immigration statutes.
On most fronts, existing training is inadequate or
nonexistent. For instance, the section of EOIR’s Immigration
Judge Benchbook dealing with “mental health issues”
includes an extensive discussion of issues relating to
competence, but no discussion at all on the effects of
The section of the Benchbook dealing with
trauma. 282
evidence and testimony is likewise silent on the challenges
faced by trauma survivors. 283 The guidance and training
given to Government lawyers is not available online, but

for specified persons); 8 CFR § 1245.2(a)(1)(i) (granting immigration judges
exclusive jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status filed by persons
in removal proceedings).
282. EOIR, Immigration Judge Benchbook, Mental Health Issues, available
at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-mental-healthissues (last visted June 15, 2015).
283. EOIR, Immigration Judge Benchbook, Evidence, available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Evidence_Guide.
pdf (last visited June 15, 2015).
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given their behavior and practices, there is every reason to
think that they are not trained well—if at all—in the
symptoms of trauma and the challenges faced by trauma
survivors.
Unfortunately, the same shortcomings are typically true
for materials aimed at lawyers who represent asylum seekers.
For instance, a book-length “Asylum Primer” published by the
American Immigration Lawyers Association includes a
detailed appendix with advice on preparing and presenting a
claim. That appendix says virtually nothing about trauma,
beyond noting that “[i]ndividuals who have experienced or
witnessed
traumatic
events
may
have
difficulty
remembering.” 284
A manual on “Winning Asylum Cases” published by the
Immigrant Legal Resource Center is more helpful but still
falls short of giving a full account of the challenges presented
by trauma survivors who seek asylum. After noting that
PTSD is “perhaps the most common mental condition suffered
by victims of torture,” 285 the manual explains that trauma
survivors may block out all or part of a traumatic event, and
may display “inappropriate behavior” during a hearing, such
as a “tendency to relate horrifying events in a flat,
emotionless voice.” 286 These concerns, the manual cautions,
may affect an attorney’s ability to prepare, the applicant’s
ability to recall events, and “the judge’s likelihood of reaching
a favorable decision. 287
The manual goes on to recommend that attorneys who
represent asylum applicants should meet with their client at
least twice before a hearing, 288 and should consider obtaining
an assessment and testimony from a mental health expert if
the client exhibits symptoms of trauma. 289 The manual’s
treatment of the subject is accurate as far as it goes, but it
falls far short of giving practicing lawyers a full
understanding of the effects of trauma, the challenges faced

284. REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 353 (Am. Immigration
Lawyer’s Assoc. 4th ed. 2005).
285. ROBERT JOBE, et al., WINNING ASYLUM CASES §§ 13–20 (Immigrant
Legal Resource Center 2004).
286. Id. at §§ 13–21.
287. Id. at §§13–21.
288. Id. at §§ 13–23.
289. Id. at §§ 13–21.
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by survivors who seek asylum, the impact of the attorney’s
work on a survivor’s ability to tell her story, and the ways an
attorney might inadvertently introduce discrepancies into the
record of proceedings. And this manual, of course, is simply a
manual, one that most immigration lawyers undoubtedly
have not read. Any person licensed to practice law may
represent an asylum seeker; there is no mandatory training
for those who wish to do so.
Unfortunately, manuals for lawyers who work with
trauma survivors in other situations are often of no greater
help.
For instance, the National Center on Domestic
Violence, Trauma and Mental Health has created a detailed,
sixty-seven page handbook for attorneys who represent
domestic violence survivors. 290 The advice in that handbook
is thorough and sound, but it devotes only six pages to the
process of interviewing the survivor and preparing her for
court, and it does not discuss in detail the impact of trauma
on a survivor’s ability to tell a consistent, “credible” story. 291
Perhaps most remarkable, even the UNHCR’s “Handbook
and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status” is silent on the issue. There are sections
dealing
with
“mentally
disturbed
persons”
and
unaccompanied minors, 292 but there is no discussion of
psychological trauma or post-traumatic distress disorder.
The Asylum Division of USCIS is the lone exception to
this pervasive lack of training on the ways that may trauma
effect a litigant’s testimony. As part of their five-week “basic
training,” asylum officers complete a unit on “interviewing
survivors.” The twenty-page lesson plan for this unit is
thorough and detailed. 293 Among other things, 294 it covers the
nature of torture and other types of trauma; the physical and

290. Mary Malefyt Seighman, et al., Representing Domestic Violence
Survivors Who Are Experiencing Trauma And Other Mental Health Challenges
(December 2011), available at http://csaj.org/document-library/mental_health
.pdf (last visited July 15, 2015) (hereinafter “Representing Survivors”).
291. Id. at 5–8, 41–44. Other topics discussed in the handbook include client
counseling (8 pages); discovery and evidence (10 pages); custody and mental
health evaluations (10 pages); and working with expert witnesses (6 pages).
292. U.N. Refugee Handbook, supra note 267, ¶¶ 206–219.
293. USCIS, Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, Asylum Officer
Basic Training Course, Interviewing Part 5: Interviewing Survivors (hereinafter
“AO Training: Interviewing Survivors”).
294. See id. at 4 (table of contents).
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psychological effects of trauma; the process of recovery; the
ways in which trauma can “inhibit applicants from fully
expressing an asylum claim”; 295 and suggested techniques for
interviewing survivors. The lesson plan emphasizes that an
interview may trigger intrusive flashbacks or other symptoms
of PTSD, and that survivors may avoid discussing certain
events, have difficulty remembering events, be confused
about details, lose composure, avoid eye contact, be
unresponsive, or have difficulty following questions or
answering coherently. 296 The training urges officers to “treat
the applicant with humanity,” and provides suggestions on
ways to “be thorough but sensitive” and “help the person feel
safe and in control.” 297
All of this is commendable, but the training falls short on
one critical point: it fails to emphasize that discrepancies in
an applicant’s story may be evidence of psychological trauma
rather than untruthfulness. The training simply stresses
instead that a survivor may respond in different ways “when
confronted with discrepancies in his or her story.” 298 A
separate lesson on “decision writing” emphasizes that officers
must make an assessment of the applicant’s credibility, and
in doing so must note any material “discrepancies,
inconsistencies, or lack of details in the applicant’s claim.” 299
But that lesson does not advise officers on the conclusions
they can properly draw from inconsistencies. Unless they are
introduced as evidence in a removal case, the decisions of
asylum officers are not public. Thus, it is impossible to assess
how well officers apply the advice they are given, and the
extent to which their negative credibility findings may be
based on inconsistencies in an applicant’s story. 300

295. Id. at 6.
296. Id. at 16–19.
297. Id. at 19–22.
298. Id. at 22.
299. AO Training: Decision Writing Part I at 10.
300. An article by mental health professionals who work with torture
survivors provides an antidote that may be typical. During an asylum
interview, a Guatamalan applicant testified that she had been raped. Because
she did not mention the rape in her declaration, the asylum officer referred her
case to an immigration court. During the immigration court hearing, however,
she presented expert testimony concerning the symptoms of PTSD, and an
immigration judge granted her application. See Gangshei & Deutsch, supra
note 20, at 82.
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The need for improved training of immigration judges,
attorneys, and asylum officers is clear and compelling. In
conjunction with that training, Congress should also revise
the standards for credibility assessment to make it clear that
immigration judges must consider the consequences of
psychological trauma and the possibility that any perceived
problems with the applicant’s testimony are the result of
trauma rather than untruthfulness. But even if the law is
not changed, judges can and should consider those issues: as
now framed, the statute permits judges to consider “all
relevant factors,” and the possible effects of trauma are
indisputably relevant.
In addition to better training, the adjudication of claims
involving survivors would benefit from modest amendments
to asylum-related statutes. Under existing law, an asylum
application must be filed within one year after an applicant’s
arrival in the United States unless the applicant
demonstrates either “changed circumstances” that materially
affect
the
applicant’s
eligibility or “extraordinary
circumstances” related to the delay in filing. 301 In addition,
the standards for credibility make no reference to the effects
of trauma on an applicant’s ability to present her case. 302 The
statute should be amended to expressly recognize that
psychological trauma is an “extraordinary circumstance,” and
should further direct that possible effects of trauma must be
taken into account when an applicant’s credibility is
considered.
Finally, just as the Government now funds and
maintains a Forensic Document Laboratory to review
questioned documents in immigration cases, 303 Congress
should consider providing psychological evaluations for
indigent asylum seekers who exhibit symptoms of trauma.
Doing so would benefit not only the asylum seekers
themselves, but also the accuracy and integrity of the
adjudication process. 304

301. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D).
302. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
303. See Department of Homeland Security, Forensic Document Lab (ICE),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/external/forensic-document-lab-ice (last visited
July 15, 2015).
304. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of psychological evaluation in
this context, see generally Gangshei & Deutsch, supra note 20.
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D. Potential Objections and Other Comments
The most vocal objections to any changes, of course, will
come from those who are deeply—and rightly—concerned
about fraudulent claims for asylum. Accurate statistics on
fraud would be impossible to compile, but anecdotal evidence
suggests the problem is serious. Over the past several
decades, there have been repeated instances in which
immigration officials have broken up criminal schemes to
perpetuate asylum fraud, some of them involving
immigration lawyers. 305
Nonetheless, the possibility of fraud should not deter the
proposed changes. The existing system’s primary check on
fraud consists of adversarial cross-examination, but without
evidence to contradict an applicant’s testimony, that strategy
is inaccurate and ineffective. By substantially reducing the
waste in the current system, resources and personnel could be
devoted to the factual investigation of key facts in many
cases.
An example from my own experience illustrates the
possibilities. An asylum applicant from the Ivory Coast
testified she was a founding member of an opposition political
party and helped organize the party’s first public
demonstration, during which police killed six party members.
The applicant was adamant that this demonstration took
place in the city of Abidjan. In fact, reports from the media
and human rights groups proved the demonstration took
place in a different city more than 200 miles away—a city the
applicant had never visited. Given their current workload,
government lawyers rarely have time to search for this sort of
evidence, but a streamlined process would allow for a more
thorough investigation of the facts underlying many cases,
and any evidence found could be provided to an asylum officer
without a formal appearance by government counsel.

305. See, e.g., Maryland lawyer convicted in asylum scheme, AP Alert – DC
Daybook (Feb. 12, 2009); Five guilty in immigration asylum scam, UPI
Newstrack (June 29, 2009); Lawyer charged in smuggling case: U.S. plans to
review status of thousands of Chinese immigrants, Dallas Morning News 6A
(Sept. 21, 2000). For a detailed account of the challenges faced by immigrants
caught up in these schemes, see Frances Robles, Tamils’ Smuggling Journey to
U.S. Leads to Longer Ordeal: 3 Years of Detention, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/us/tamils-smuggling-journey-to-us-leads-tolonger-ordeal-3-years-of-detention.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
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There is a second and more compelling reason why
concerns about fraud should not deter the shift to a nonadversarial system of adjudication. If a legitimate refugee is
denied asylum, the stakes are enormous: the applicant’s
safety and life may literally be in danger. On the other hand,
the stakes are minimal in most cases involving fraud: the
government—and society at large—would lose little if asylum
is incorrectly granted to someone who is not a refugee. In
cases where the stakes are higher—for instance, if there is
reason to think an applicant has been involved in terrorism,
the persecution of others, or serious criminal activity—the
procedures could easily allow for government lawyers to
participate in hearings, present evidence, and cross-examine
the applicant.
CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of our current asylum procedures have
been decades in the making. In the Refugee Act of 1980,
Congress enacted sweeping changes to U.S. refugee laws. As
Sen. Edward Kennedy (the lead sponsor) explained, the
changes were intended to “reform the discriminatory and
outdated refugee provisions” then in place, and to “insure
greater equity in our treatment of refugees.” 306 But at that
time, the dynamics of psychological trauma were not yet well
understood, and the procedures envisioned by the Refugee
Act’s sponsors did not account for the needs of trauma
survivors. Later amendments to the law—most notably the
statutory provisions related to credibility and corroboration—
have made matters worse, not better.
Beneath
the
laws
themselves
are
deep
misunderstandings about the character of “true” stories, the
truthfulness of storytellers, and the supposed power of crossexamination to distinguish between truth and falsehood. For
trauma survivors, the system remains both discriminatory
and outdated, and the Refugee Act’s full promise cannot be
met without further reform.
Some might suggest that it would be enough to provide
better training for everyone involved in the process, and that
further changes are unnecessary. To do so would be an
306. 125 Cong. Rec. S2630 (daily ed. March 13, 1979) (statement of Edward
Kennedy).
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improvement over the current state of affairs, but it would
leave the United States with an expensive, unwieldy system
that remains ill-equipped to assess the credibility of the
asylum applicants who are most vulnerable and most in need
of the safety that asylum offers.
Adversarial systems of adjudication are grounded in the
premise that the “truth” benefits from a contest of wills in
which competing sides present evidence and “test” the
evidence offered by the other side. But when the witness is a
trauma survivor, adversarial cross-examination is not an
“engine of truth,” but rather a cudgel by which both the
witness and the truth are likely to be beaten and broken.
Isak Dinesen once suggested that “[a]ll sorrows can be
borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about
them.” 307 But for trauma survivors, simply telling the story is
not enough: others must believe the story to be true. This
Article is intended to point the way forward, from the broken
procedures that now exist toward a more humane system for
adjudicating asylum claims.

307. Those words were attributed to Dineson by Hannah Arendt, but Arendt
provided no source. See Lynn R. Wilkinson, Hannah Arendt on Isak Dinesen:
Between Storytelling and Theory, 56 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE 77, 77 (Winter
2004).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Federal Appellate Decisions that Review a Negative
Credibility Finding in an Asylum Case: 2010
For this study, researchers examined 369 decisions*
issued by the Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2010. Each of these
cases reviewed an immigration judge’s negative credibility
finding in an asylum case. Table 1 breaks down those cases
by circuit, and includes both the raw number of cases
remanded in each circuit and the percentage of cases
affirmed. Of the 369 cases, 15 were remanded, and the
remaining 354 cases were affirmed.
Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Forth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh
Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh
Circuit
Total

Number
of Cases
4
130
55
2
14
24
6

Cases
Remanded
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Percentage
Affirmed
100.0%
99.2%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

7
84
3
40

0
12
0
2

100.0%
85.7%
100.0%
95.0%

369

15

95.9%

* An additional 44 cases were reviewed but were not included because the
decision does not clearly identify grounds for the negative credibility finding.
Also, cases involving a single appellate decision for two or more family members
with related claims were treated as a single case.
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TABLE 2
Factors Identified By Immigration Judges As Support for
a Negative Credibility Finding
In most cases, judges listed two to four factors in support
of the negative credibility finding. For the 369 cases reviewed,
Table 2 lists the number of decisions that mention each of
various factors. The first category listed includes
inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony at the asylum
hearing, as well as inconsistencies between the testimony and
the applicant’s prior statements. This category is broken
down further in Table 3.
Applicant’s story was inconsistent
Other
aspects
of
testimony
(vague,
implausible, etc.)
Applicant’s demeanor
Applicant’s story was inconsistent with other
evidence
Applicant failed to corroborate story
All other factors

318 (86.2%)
84 (22.8%)
65 (17.6%)
171 (46.3%)
158 (42.8%)
36 (9.8%)
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TABLE 3
Breakdown of Decisions That Relied on Inconsistencies in
the Applicant’s Story
As noted above, 318 of the 369 cases (86.2%) relied on one
or more inconsistencies in the applicant’s story as grounds for
a negative credibility finding. Table 3 breaks that group down
further into combinations of three distinct types of
inconsistency.
The testimony was:
Number
(A)Internally inconsistent
(B) Inconsistent with the
declaration
(C) Inconsistent with other
prior statements
(A) only
(B) only
(C) only
(A) + (B)
(A) + (C)
(B) + (C)
(A) + (B) + (C)

67
81
26
77
15
39
24

172
210

Percentage of
All Cases
46.6%
56.9%

104

28.2%
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Breakdown of Cases that Relied on Inconsistencies
between the Testimony and Other Prior Statements as
Grounds for a Negative Credibility Finding
In 104 cases (28.2% of the total) the immigration judge
relied on inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony
and the applicant’s prior statements other than a written
declaration. Table 4 breaks this down to separate out the
cases in which the judge relied on a record of the applicant’s
statements during an asylum interview.
Total cases
Testimony inconsistent with asylum
interview only
Testimony inconsistent with other prior
statements
Testimony inconsistent with both asylum
interview and other statements

104
39
51
14
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TABLE 5
Breakdown of Factors Considered in Cases for Which the
Applicant’s Story Was Not Inconsistent
In 51 cases (13.3% of the total), the immigration judge
did not mention inconsistencies in the applicant’s story, but
nonetheless found the applicant not credible for other
reasons. Table 5 identifies the factors the immigration judge
relied on in these cases.
(A) Story was inconsistent
with other evidence
(B) Applicant failed to
corrorborate testimony
(C) All other factors,
including demeanor
(A) only
(B) only
(C) only
(A) + (B)
(A) + (C)
(B) + (C)
(A) + (B) + (C)

22
4
1
7
5
2
10

Number
44
21
13
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Cases that Combine External Factors with Inconsistencies
in the Applicant’s Story
As noted above, in most cases immigration judges relied
on two to four factors to support a negative credibility finding.
Table 6 lists five factors that do not involve inconsistencies in
the applicant’s story. For each of those factors, the table
demonstrates that judges rarely relied on such factors alone.
Instead, these factors were usually combined with an
inconsistency in the applicant’s story.
(A) Applicant’s story inconsistent with
other
evidence

171

Applicant’s story was also internally
inconsistent
(B) Applicant failed to corroborate
story

120

Applicant’s story was also internally
inconsistent
(C) Demeanor

135

Applicant’s story was also internally
inconsistent
(D) Other aspects of testimony (vague,
implausible, etc.)

158
85.4%

65
57
84

Applicant’s story was also internally
inconsistent
73
(E)
Other grounds for negative 36
credibility
finding
Applicant’s story was also internally
inconsistent

70.2%

34

87.7%

86.9%

94.1%
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TABLE 7
Factors Considered in Conjunction with Inconsistencies
Between the Applicant’s Testimony and the Written
Declaration
As noted above, in 210 cases (56.9% of the total) an
immigration judge relied on inconsistencies between the
applicant’s testimony and a written declaration prepared by
the applicant’s lawyer. In most of those cases, the judge also
relied on other factors. Table 7 identifies the number of times
each of these other factors was relied on.
Inconsistency between testimony and declaration
only
Testimony itself was also inconsistent
Testimony was inconsistent with other prior
statements
Applicant’s demeanor
Also other aspects of testimony (vague,
implausible, etc.)
Testimony was inconsistent with other evidence
Applicant failed to corroborate testimony
Also other factors

21
90
63
31
51
79
81
23

TABLE 8
The Number of Factors Cited In Each Decision
Factors
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Cases
64
95
122
62
17
7
1
1

